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THE ROLE OF SHARED MENTAL MODELS IN TEAM COORDINATION CREW 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SKILLS OF MUTUAL PERFORMANCE 
MONITORING AND BACKUP BEHAVIORS 




The purpose of Crew Resource Management (CRM) is to improve flight crew 
coordination in multipiloted cockpits and in turn increase aviation flight safety.  One 
aspect of CRM team coordination is the ability for flight crews to monitor each other 
properly and provide the appropriate backup if necessary.  The author explores the role of 
shared mental models among Coast Guard rotary wing cockpit flight crews and their 
influence on monitoring and backup behaviors during nighttime overwater flight 
maneuvers.  Using the Coast Guard’s MH-65 Operational Flight Trainer located at the 
Coast Guard Aviation Training Center in Mobile, Alabama, cockpit flight crews flew 
automated and manual instrument takeoff (ITO) maneuvers.  Coast Guard CRM subject 
matter experts observed the interaction of the cockpit flight crews judging the level of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the ITO maneuvers.  Using 
a repeated measures design, the researcher investigated the relationship and interaction 
between ITO maneuver shared mental model, type of ITO maneuver, and pilot flight time 
on cockpit flight crew monitoring and backup behaviors.  Findings indicate a significant 
relationship between cockpit automation and levels of mutual performance monitoring 
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Aviation is an essential operational capability of the U.S. Coast Guard for the 
safety, security, and stewardship of U.S. maritime interests (U.S. Coast Guard, 2014b, 
2014c).  Coast Guard flight crews operate at Coast Guard Air Stations across the country 
flying multi-mission aircraft supporting the missions of the Coast Guard.  The primary 
missions of Coast Guard flight crews is operational response to search and rescue, law 
and treaties enforcement, marine environmental protection, and military readiness (U.S. 
Coast Guard, 2013).  However, Coast Guard aircraft accidents reduce operational 
effectiveness, cost lives, and damage valuable equipment.   
In 2010, the Coast Guard experienced five Class A flight mishaps resulting in loss 
of lives and costing the organization $124,860,386 (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a).  These 
five Class A flight mishaps represented the highest annual Class A flight mishap cost 
ever experienced by the Coast Guard (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a).  Coast Guard aviation 
leaders responded by calling for a comprehensive safety review of all aspects of aviation 
operations (M. Emerson, personal communication, July 28, 2010).  The primary focus of 
the review was identifying aviation operational deficiencies and possible areas for flight 
safety improvement.  One outcome of the safety review was the evaluation and refocus of 
the Crew Resource Management (CRM) program for Coast Guard flight crews (U.S. 
Coast Guard, 2010a).  A few years earlier, then Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard 
Aviation Training Center expressed concern to aviation program managers about the 




“check in the box” for Coast Guard flight crews and called for a comprehensive training 
upgrade (D. R. Callahan, personal communication, June 19, 2007).  
Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
According to Harris (2011), aviation is a sociotechnical system consisting of 
complex interactions between humans and technology.  Aviation CRM is a management 
process encouraging the optimal use of human resources in today’s aircraft cockpits.  
According to Helmreich, Merritt, and Wilhelm (1999), CRM represents human 
performance and its limitations in the cockpit.  The U.S. Coast Guard (2014a) defines 
CRM as “the effective use of all available resources for flight crews to assure a safe and 
efficient operation, reducing error, avoiding stress, and increasing efficiency” (p. 20-3).  
Aviation CRM attempts to combat human error among flight crews by training and 
improving non-technical skills such as communication, coordination, and teamwork 
(Flin, O’Conner, & Crichton, 2008; Kanki, Helmreich, & Anca, 2010; Wiener, Kanki, & 
Helmreich, 1993).  Beginning in the 1970s in response to several commercial airline 
accidents exposing poor crew communication and coordination, CRM is now prevalent in 
many high-risk, dynamic team environments and organizations (Fraher, 2011; Helmreich 
et al., 1999).  In aviation, the primary purpose of CRM is increasing flight safety by 
improving teamwork effectiveness of flight crews (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009).  Reason 
(1997) argues that aviation CRM has proven successful in improving flight crew 
performance through situational awareness sharing, enhanced leadership, and better crew 







The focus of CRM training is to prevent aviation accidents by improving and 
optimizing individual and crew performance (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 
2004; U.S. Coast Guard, 2014a).  The FAA (2004) further defines CRM training 
essentials and the role of flight crews with the following stated guidelines:  
1. CRM training is most effective within a training program centered on 
clear, comprehensive [Standard Operating Procedures] SOPs; 
2. CRM training should focus on the functioning of crewmembers as 
teams, not as a collection of technically competent individuals; 
3. CRM training should instruct crewmembers how to behave in ways 
that foster crew effectiveness; 
4. CRM training should provide opportunities for crewmembers to 
practice the skills necessary to be effective team leaders and team 
members; 
5. CRM training exercises should include all crewmembers functioning 
in the same roles (e.g. captain, first officer, and/or flight engineer, 
flight attendants) that they normally perform in flight;  
6. CRM training should include effective team behaviors during normal 
routine operations.  (p. 6)   
Human Error in the Cockpit 
Aviation CRM training also focuses on improving cognitive and psychosocial 
skills of flight crewmembers (Kanki et al., 2010), which primarily manifest through 




cockpit flight crews’ interpersonal and cognitive teamwork processes can directly 
increase flight safety and reduce the number of accidents attributed to human error (FAA, 
2004; Foushee, 1984; Lauber, 1987; Oser, Salas, Merket, Walwanis, & Bergondy, 2000).  
In fact, reducing the accidents caused by human error is the major thrust of recent CRM 
error management initiatives and human factors accident analyses (Helmreich & Merritt, 
2000; Helmreich, Wilhelm, Klinect, & Merritt, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001, 
2003).  Although new viewpoints  now exist about the role of CRM training,  reducing 
cockpit human errors and aircraft accidents through CRM training remains a prevailing 
view among human factor researchers and aviation safety experts today (Flin et al., 2008; 
O’Conner & O’Dea, 2007; U.S. Coast Guard, 2009a; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).    
However, others believe aircraft accidents are not caused by unreliable and 
irresponsible flight crews committing errors but occur because complex systems are 
basically unsafe and represent competing values in a resource-constrained world (Dekker, 
2002, 2003; Perrow, 1999).  Researchers now argue that human resilience, flexibility, and 
adaptability create safety in complex systems (Cook, O’Conner, Render, & Woods, 2004; 
Dekker, 2002, 2003, 2006; Reason, 2008).  According to Reason (2008), the human 
contribution of individual and collective mindfulness is required in complex and dynamic 
environments where human and technical failures are unavoidable.  Fraher (2011) 
believes that teams operating in high-risk dynamic environments must evolve and adapt 
to changing workplace conditions and further suggests that today’s advanced 
technologies require teams with increased communication, improved coordination, and 






Shared Mental Models  
 
Effective crew performance coordination requires shared mental models among 
flight crewmembers (FAA, 2003), and research shows shared mental models enhance 
crew coordination (Grote, Kolbe, Zala-Mezo, Bienefeld-Seall, & Kunzle, 2010; Krieger, 
2005; Sperling & Pritchett, 2011).  A positive relationship exists among shared mental 
models, team processes, and performance (Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002; 
Marks, Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Salas, 2005; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Rentsch & 
Klimoski, 2001; Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu, & Kraiger, 2005; Waller, Gupta, & 
Giambatista, 2004; Zou & Lee, 2010).  Teams operating in high-risk environments, such 
as aircraft cockpits, must cultivate a shared mindfulness which ensures a proactive 
approach to safety and sustained vigilance (Fraher, 2011; Krieger, 2005).  Cockpit flight 
crews align expectations and increase safety by using shared mental models tools such as 
standardized phraseology, standardized operating procedures, and pre-established verbal 
communication (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).     
Mutual Performance Monitoring and Backup Behaviors 
Shared mental models enhance team effectiveness by providing the underpinning 
for mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors decisions (Salas, Rosen, 
Burke, Goodwin, & Fiore, 2006).  Through shared mental models, team members decide 
if, when, and what type of monitoring and backup is appropriate and required.   
Monitoring and backup behaviors are team coordination processes which increase the 
awareness of other team members’ actions and cause members to pay attention and 




Priest, & Andrews, 2007).  According to Sumwalt, Thomas, and Dismukes (2003), pilots 
use monitoring and cross checking to increase flight safety.  Since the goal of CRM 
training in aircraft multipiloted cockpits is to increase flight safety by improving flight 
crew coordination, Sumwalt et al. (2003) argue that monitoring and backup skills need to 
be the next focus of aviation CRM training.    
Pilot Monitoring and Cockpit Automation 
Cockpit flight crews also use mental models when monitoring aircraft automation 
and establish expectations of the behavior of those automation systems (Bjorklund, 
Alfredson, & Dekker, 2006; Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997).  However, researchers 
believe that flight crew monitoring performance decreases when aircraft are controlled by 
highly reliable cockpit automated systems such as autopilot, flight director system, and 
flight management system (Mouloua, Hancock, Jones, & Vincenzi, 2010).  Cockpit 
automation is associated with poorer human-monitoring performance (Casner & 
Schooler, 2014; Comstock & Arnegard, 1992; Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Dismukes & 
Berman, 2010).  According to Mouloua et al. (2010), cockpit automation impacts human-
monitoring performance and monitoring strategies based on flight crew shared mental 
models (Mouloua et al., 2010). 
Shared Mental Models in Coast Guard Aviation 
Coast Guard aviation now recognizes the significance of shared mental models 
among cockpit flight crews.  Interim Change 5 of the MH-65 Aircraft Flight Manual 
released in April of 2013 updates procedures associated with helicopter overwater ITOs 
and specifically addresses the role of shared mental models with the following guidance:  




departure brief prior to commencing a coupled or manual ITO to ensure a shared mental 
model amongst all crewmembers” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b, p. 2-19).  Interim Change 5 
also defined pilot flying and safety pilot responsibilities during aircraft-automated 
coupled ITOs and pilot flying manual ITOs.  The goal of the updated procedures is to 
increase cockpit flight crew effectiveness by establishing standard pilot flying actions and 
safety pilot verbal calls and monitoring duties during both types of ITOs.  However, the 
value or influence of shared mental models in Coast Guard cockpits and their role in 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during cockpit automated and non-
automated critical flight phases is unclear.  
Statement of the Problem 
Coast Guard CRM training attempts to reduce human error and increase flight 
safety by improving flight crew coordination.  However, recent Coast Guard aircraft 
mishaps costing lives and millions of dollars, coupled with the new views that human 
resiliency, flexibility, adaptability, and shared mental models create safety by improving 
flight crew coordination and performance, highlight the need for a clearer understanding 
of the role of shared mental models and cockpit automation on mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors in Coast Guard cockpits. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of the ITO maneuver shared 
mental model among Coast Guard aircraft cockpit flight crews, ITO type (coupled or 






Research Objectives (RO) 
 The research objectives of the study are as follows: 
RO1:  Describe the demographics of the study population according to pilot 
designation/qualification and cockpit flight crew total flight time experience.  
RO2:  Determine the level of mental model sharedness in MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight 
crews of ITO maneuver critical team tasks.   
RO3:  Determine the relationship between the ITO maneuver shared mental model score 
and observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in 
MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews. 
RO4:  Compare the type of ITO (coupled or manual) on observed levels of mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight 
crews. 
RO5:  Determine the relationship between flight crew total flight time and observed 
levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft 
cockpit flight crews. 
RO6:  Determine the combined interaction effect of the ITO maneuver shared mental 
model score, ITO type, and flight crew total flight time on observed levels of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft cockpit 
flight crews. 
Conceptual Framework 
Figure 1 provides the conceptual framework for depicting the existence of cockpit 
flight crew ITO shared mental model (RO2) and its relationship with mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors (RO3).  The ITO type (coupled or manual) and cockpit 
 
crew total pilot time may 
behaviors (RO4 and RO5)
model, ITO type, and cockpit flight crew total flight time on mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors
Figure 1.  Conceptual Framework of the Study’s Research Objectives and Variables
Data collection will consist
and a Monitoring/Backup 
MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crewmember behaviors 
65D Operational Flight Trainer located at 
(ATC) in Mobile, Alabama
and ITO maneuver scenario 
 
also influence mutual performance monitoring and backup 
.  The combined interaction effect of the ITO shared mental 
 is shown in RO6. 
 of a Shared Mental Model Instrument 
Behaviors Instrument (RO3, RO4, RO5, RO6)
during ITO maneuvers 
the Coast Guard Aviation Training Center 
.  A complete description of the instruments, data collection














Significance of the Study 
 
 From a human capital standpoint, the selection, training, and proficiency of Coast 
Guard pilots directly affects the success of Coast Guard aviation operational missions.  
The ability of Coast Guard flight crew to operate in extreme and hazardous environments 
in a highly professional and safe manner protects flight crews and saves lives.   
The significance of the study is the expected applicability to other Coast Guard 
rotary-wing and fixed wing aircraft cockpits beyond the MH-65.  Though the aircraft 
equipment and models may differ, cockpit flight crew procedures and protocol in Coast 
Guard multipiloted aircraft is highly similar to that of other aircraft.  Research insights 
are immediately available and applicable to all Coast Guard cockpit flight crew.  Military 
CRM, specifically CRM in Coast Guard cockpits, have concentrated on skills identified 
twenty years ago.  To stay current, CRM in the Coast Guard must evolve as research 
clarifies new aspects of cockpit flight crew coordination.   
Assumptions 
 
 Because the MH-65 pilots participating in the study are attending their normal 
recurrent training at ATC Mobile, it is assumed that they accurately represent the 
population of duty-standing pilots assigned to Coast Guard Air Stations at the seventeen 
operational units across the United States and Puerto Rico.  A second assumption is that 
participants taking part in the study are under no perceived pressure to participate and 
will perform in a manner similar to their normal cockpit protocol and performance 
abilities.  Thirdly, the study participants are expected to answer the survey questions 
truthfully and without bias.  Finally, the researcher assumed the methods used for 




performance literature are valid (Marks et al., 2000, 2002; Mathieu et al., 2005; Mathieu 
et al., 2000; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2005), and that the Monitoring/Backup Behaviors 
Instrument aligns with methods found in Salas, Sims, & Burke (2005) and Wilson et al. 
(2007).  
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
  
The researcher was not involved in the selection of the pilots attending the ATC 
Mobile training course, and therefore pilots may not truly represent the total MH-65 pilot 
population.  To narrow the scope of research, the study was limited to the MH-65 aircraft 
community and did not include the other four Coast Guard operational aircraft (MH-60T, 
HC-144A, HC-130H, HC-130J).  All pilots participating in the study are designated in 
aircraft model type and currently meet proficiency standards defined in the Coast Guard 
Air Operations Manual (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  Also, the CRM experts using the 
measurement instrument to analyze mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors during the ITO maneuvers may view the behaviors differently and therefore 
affect interrater reliability.      
Definition of Key Terms 
The following provides further clarity to key terms used within the aviation 
industry: 
1. Advisory Circular – A document distributed by the Federal Aviation 
Administration to guide and inform those involved in the aviation industry.  Though not 
regulatory in nature, Advisory Circulars provide direction and information on specific 





2. Autopilot – “Those units and components that furnish a means of automatically 
controlling the aircraft” (Jeppesen, 2012, p. 34) 
3. Aviation human factors – Human capabilities and limitations in the aviation 
environment and the study of influences that enhance safety and performance of those  
operating in the aviation system (Koonce, 1979). 
4. Backup behaviors – “Ability to anticipate other team members’ needs through 
accurate knowledge about their responsibilities.  This includes the ability to shift 
workload among members to achieve balance during high periods of workload or 
pressure” (Salas et al., 2005, p. 560). 
5. Briefing – “Verbal conference conducted between the pilots before the 
beginning of certain phase of workload that will be requiring coordination and therefore 
an agreed-upon plan; for example, before takeoff, or before starting an approach to the 
destination airport” (Dismukes, Berman, & Loulopoulos, 2007, p. 313). The specific 
items of briefings are normally defined in varies aviation operations standard operating 
procedures.  
6. Cockpit automation – The execution of a task, function, or service by an 
automated system such as a flight management system, flight director system, and 
autopilot to control navigation, engine power, and system monitoring of the aircraft 
(Dismukes et al., 2007; Mouloua et al., 2010).   
7. Cockpit flight crew – Members of a cockpit team who hold pilot designations 




 8. Coupled ITO – An instrument takeoff using the aircraft’s flight director system 
and automatic flight control system to transition aircraft from a hover to a climb out 
profile (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b).   
9. Designation – “Certification that a pilot or aircrew member has met training 
and experience requirements to operate an aircraft day or night, cross-country, in all 
weather conditions for which the aircraft is certified” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013, Glossary-
6). 
10. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) – “The government agency that 
regulates flight operations and safety aspects of commercial aviation in the United States” 
(Dismukes et al., 2007, p. 317). 
11. Flight Director System – “A form of automatic flight control in which all of 
the information is displayed to the pilot rather than being used to actuate control servos” 
(Jeppesen, 2012, p. 136).  A flight director system can be “coupled” to the aircraft’s flight 
controls and provide a means of automatically controlling the aircraft. 
12. Flight Safety Officer – A specific billet at aviation commands responsible for 
advising and assisting the unit’s Commanding Officer in issues relating to aviation safety 
and risk management processes.  Interchangeable with the term Aviation Safety Officer. 
13. Hindsight bias – A human tendency to evaluate past events in light of what is 
now known about the event.  This bias can cause a person to oversimplify an event and 
assume things blatantly obvious about the event after the fact were obvious during the 
event. (Dismukes et al., 2007). 
14. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) – An analysis 




casual factors in aviation accidents.  The human casual factor classifications  are based on 
Reason’s (1990a, 1997) Swiss Cheese Model (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
15. Instrument takeoff (ITO) – A maneuver utilized when ambient conditions 
cause reduced visibility, e.g. precipitation, low ceiling, or lack of visible horizon, and 
helicopter induced restrictions to visibility such as blowing dust or water caused by the 
rotor downwash.  ITOs are invaluable aids when taking off at night and toward and over 
water or deserted areas (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b; U.S. Navy, 2009). 
16. Manual ITO – An instrument takeoff which the pilot flying, also known as 
[pilot at the controls], manipulates the flight controls to transition from a hover to a climb 
out profile  (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b). 
17. Mutual performance monitoring – “The ability to develop common 
understandings of the team environment and apply appropriate task strategies to 
accurately monitor teammate performance” (Salas et al., 2005).  
18. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) – “U.S. government agency 
responsible for investigating and determining the probable cause of civil aviation 
accidents” (Dismukes et al., 2007, p. 324). 
19. Operational Flight Trainer (OFT) – A flight simulation device representing 
aircraft flight and system characteristics used to train individual pilots or cockpit flight 
crews (Moroney & Moroney (2010).  Interchangeable with the term flight simulator.  
20. Operational Risk Management (ORM) – “A continuous, systematic process 
for identifying and controlling risks.  The process includes detecting hazards, assessing 
risks, and implementing and monitoring risk controls to support effective, risk-based 




21. Pilot at the controls – “The pilot operating the flight controls (cyclic, 
collective, and pedals)…The [pilot at the controls] is responsible for movement and 
maneuvering of the aircraft via control inputs with reference to either visual or instrument 
information.”  (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b, p. 4-1).  Interchangeable with the term pilot 
flying. 
22. Pilot flying – The pilot who is controlling the aircraft in flight by manipulating 
the flight controls, thrust or power control levers, and flight management system 
(Dismukes et al., 2007). 
23. Pilot in command – The pilot, in a multipiloted aircraft, who has been 
delegated to take charge of the aircraft and be accountable for a specific flight or mission.  
Normally, the pilot in command is normally the pilot in the aircraft who holds the highest 
designation and qualification in aircraft type.  “The [pilot in command] is responsible for 
the safe, orderly, efficient and effective performance of the aircraft, aircrew and 
passengers during the entire mission” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013, p. 2-6). 
24. Pilot monitoring – Pilot responsible for monitoring the actions of the pilot 
flying, aircraft systems, and radio communications.  (Dismukes et. al., 2007; U.S. Coast 
Guard, 2013)  Interchangeable with the term safety pilot and pilot not at the controls.  
Safety pilot – 
During dual pilot operation of the aircraft, the safety pilot is the pilot not 
operating the flight controls.  The safety pilot provides backup to the pilot 
operating the aircraft controls by performing cockpit duties such as checklists, 
briefings, communications, and cockpit automation tasks.  In general, the safety 




controls] from concentration on flight control operation with reference to visual or 
instrument information.  During critical phases of flight, the safety pilot shall 
monitor the flight controls as much as practicable.  The safety pilot should have 
his/her hands near the primary flight controls to allow monitoring of the [pilot at 
the controls’] flight control inputs and be prepared to assist in aircraft control or to 
take over the flight controls if the situation dictates. (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b, p. 
4-1)   
25. Shared mental models – “An organizing knowledge structure of the 
relationships among the task the team is engaged in and how the team members will 
interact” (Salas et al., 2005, p. 561).  Shared mental models provide a common 
understanding between team members and allows them to anticipate what is required by 
the other team members (Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milanovich, 1999). 
26. Sociotechnical system – A system consisting of complex interactions between 
personnel and the technology in the workplace and includes societal infrastructures and 
behavior in the organization.  “Sociotechnical systems contain people, equipment and 
organizational structures...linked by functional processes and social processes which are 
informal but which may serve to either facilitate or hinder the functional processes” 
(Harris, 2011, p. 7). 
27. Threat and error management  – Assuming that human error is inevitable, 
threat and error management is a three layer error defense countermeasure strategy 
including 1) avoiding error, 2) trapping errors before they are occur, and 3) managing the 




28. Total pilot time – “Time spent at a flight control position (in an authorized 
aircraft or simulator) by Coast Guard aviators and student pilots who are assigned duty 
involving flying” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013, Glossary-17). 
Chapter Summary 
 Aviation CRM is an accepted practice in the industry for increasing flight crew 
effectiveness by improving teamwork processes. Understanding the role of shared mental 
models among flight crews and their impact on mutual performance monitoring and 
backup behaviors can lead to clearer CRM instructional strategies and training outcomes.  
Chapter II of this study shows recent Coast Guard aircraft accidents, views on human 
error in complex systems, and the history of CRM in commercial and military aviation.  
New views of human error and recent research of teamwork processes associated with 
shared mental models shed new light on the role of team coordination CRM skills of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors and their ability to improve 







REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
This section first reviews the recent increase in Coast Guard aircraft accidents and 
resulting impact to CRM training.  Aviation CRM was initially a response to human error 
in the cockpit and the failure of flight crew coordination and communication in 
commercial and military aircraft cockpits.  A more recent understanding of human error 
in the cockpit includes the role of organizations in aircraft accidents which suggests a 
more systemic view of aircraft accidents (Reason, 1990a, 1997, 2008) and inevitability of 
human error in complex sociotechnical systems (Cook et al., 2004; Dekker, 2006; 
Perrow, 1999).  Teamwork processes significantly influence the effectiveness of teams in 
highly dynamic work environments such as aircraft cockpits (Marks, Mathieu, & 
Zaccaro, 2001; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008), and shared mental models 
among flight crews lead to improved teamwork process of pilot monitoring and backup 
behaviors (Grote et al., 2010; Krieger, 2005; Mathieu et al., 2000; Sperling & Pritchett, 
2011).   
Coast Guard Aviation 
Aircraft are a primary asset in the execution of Coast Guard missions and 
Maritime Domain Awareness (Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee, 2005; 
U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  The Coast Guard has utilized aircraft to enhance search, 
rescue, and law enforcement maritime operations for nearly a hundred years.  With close 
ties to naval aviation and following a similar developmental path (U. S. Coast Guard 
Aviation Association, 2003-2006), Coast Guard aviation provides a major operational 




wing aircraft in the U.S. maritime environment.  However, aircraft mishaps (accidents) 
reduce operational effectiveness, cost lives, and damage and destroy valuable assets.  
Department of Defense Services and Coast Guard Aviation Accidents     
Table 1 shows a comparison between Class A flight mishap rate averages of 
Department of Defense services and Coast Guard since 2000 (see Appendix A for flight 
mishap classifications).       
Table 1 
Department of Defense and Coast Guard Class A flight Annual Mishap Rates 2000-2012 






















































































Average 0.88 1.12 1.67 1.36 2.47 
                                                          
1 Class A flight mishaps per 100,000 flight hours is an aviation industry standard enabling the normalizing 




As seen in Table 1, the Coast Guard average annual rate remained below other 
services.  However, in fiscal year 2010 the Coast Guard experienced five Class A flight 
mishaps costing the organization $124,860,386 (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a).  These five 
Class A flight mishaps represent the highest annual Class A flight mishap cost ever 
experienced by the Coast Guard (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a).  As shown in Table 1 and 
Figure 2, the five Class A flight mishaps resulted in an annual mishap rate of 4.26 per 
100,000 flight hours (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a).   
 
Figure 2.  Coast Guard Class A Flight Mishap Rate Fiscal Year 2000-2012  
With the exception of the U. S. Marine Corps 2004 annual mishap rate of 5.18, 
the Coast Guard’s Class A flight mishap rate of 4.26 in 2010 is higher than all 
Department of Defense aviation counterparts for the period from FY00 to FY12 (see 
Table 1).  Until 2010, the Coast Guard averaged one Class A flight mishap a year for 
nearly 30 years, and the last time the Coast Guard experienced more than two Class A 
flight mishaps in a single year was 1982 (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a).  The five Class A 




















Coast Guard Class A Flight Mishaps 




prompted a comprehensive review of all aspects of Coast Guard aviation (U.S. Coast 
Guard , 2010a).  
Aviation Safety Assessment Action Plan  
 In May of 2010, after a seven-month period involving four of the Class A flight 
mishaps, Coast Guard leaders chartered the Aviation Safety Assessment Action Plan (M. 
Emerson, personal communication, July 28, 2010).  The Aviation Safety Assessment 
Action Plan was a comprehensive review of Coast Guard aviation operations with the 
goal of enhancing flight safety, improving operational effectiveness, and identifying 
mishap reduction opportunities.  The focus of the effort was not individual mishap 
investigations but an overarching review attempting to “identify underlying common 
contributory factors present in the Coast Guard aviation environment” (U.S. Coast Guard, 
2010a, p. 3).  Coast Guard leaders were interested in exploring subtle negative influences 
possibly undermining the aviation culture environment.  The Aviation Safety Assessment 
Action Plan consisted of five distinct analysis components:  (a) an operational hazard 
analysis, (b) an aviation data collection and safety survey, (c) aviation leadership 
improvement focus group, (d) an independent data analysis and process assessment 
study, and (e) Coast Guard aviation association industry benchmarking study (U.S. Coast 
Guard, 2010a).    
 After the yearlong multifaceted review, the findings identified five overarching 
Coast Guard aviation deficiencies (J. P. Currier, personal communication, October 15, 
2011), with four of the deficiencies directly relating to human factors.  One specific 
human factor finding was the degradation of ORM and CRM practices.  According to the 




resources, hardware, and information – with the goal of optimizing human performance 
and reducing human error in the aviation environment” (p. 9).  The major tenets of Coast 
Guard CRM are flight discipline, leadership, risk management, decision making, 
situational awareness, communications, and assertiveness (U.S. Coast Guard, n.d.-a).  
Though Coast Guard CRM has been in place since the early 1990s, the Aviation Safety 
Assessment Action Plan found problems in CRM training delivery methods and less than 
optimum targeting of training audiences (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010a).  The plan’s findings 
resulted in several CRM training improvement initiatives.  A memorandum from then 
Commanding Officer of ATC Mobile outlined two actions taken in response to CRM 
findings: first, specific unit-based CRM discussions and review of human factors aircraft 
mishap as part of the annual standardization visit to Coast Guard Air Stations, and 
second, a written assessment of CRM skills on all pilot evaluation check flights (S. C. 
Truhlar, personal communication, September 1, 2010).  The unit-based CRM discussion 
and associated mishap review allowed CRM training to be tailored specifically to the 
unit’s aircraft, daily flying environment, and mission, and the CRM written assessment 
provided feedback on individual pilot CRM strengths and documented areas for 
improvement (T. D. Jones, personal communication, November 10, 2010; S. C. Truhlar, 
personal communication, September 1, 2010)  
Though changes were made to Coast Guard CRM training as a result of the 
Aviation Safety Assessment Action Plan findings, senior leader support and commitment 
to CRM tenets and training remained high.  Vice Admiral (VADM) J.P. Currier, Vice 




emphasized the role of CRM and teamwork among flight crewmembers during an 
interview about Coast Guard flight crew proficiency and initiative: 
Everyone in the [flight] crew has a part to play in the success of that mission.  
And our principles, including CRM, are such that everyone has a voice.  If you’re 
not comfortable, you’re duty-bound to speak up.  Clearly, the aircraft commander 
makes the final call, but we all have a role and voice.  On a crewed aircraft, we fly 
best as a team. (Johnson, 2013, p. 9) 
Considering the recent findings and recommendations of the Aviation Safety Assessment 
Action Plan, a review of Coast Guard mishaps shows that human error, and specifically 
CRM failures, is not a recent trend.  
Human Error in Coast Guard Aviation 
Aviation human factors mishap data helps deconstruct system failures and enables 
a more thorough identification of hazards (U.S. Coast Guard, 2012).  A review of Coast 
Guard Class A aviation mishaps for the past 20 years indicates human factors a central 
causal factor contributing to at least nineteen of the twenty-four Class A mishaps (79%; 
B. A. Potter, personal communication, March 1, 2013).  This 79% closely aligns with the 
60-80% human error accidents percentage normally cited in other military and 
commercial aviation mishap analysis (e.g., Flin et al., 2008; O’Conner & O’Dea, 2007; 
Wiegman & Shappell, 2003).  Coast Guard aviation safety leaders suggest that human 
error in aviation mishaps is as high as 85% and is the most common cause factor in Coast 
Guard aviation mishaps (U.S. Coast Guard, 2009a).  In fact, human error in Coast Guard 
cockpits led to the recent adoption of the Department of Defense Human Factors 




2010a)  The Department of Defense HFACS framework allows a better understanding of 
the underlying human factor causes in aviation accidents (Gibb & Olson, 2008).  See 
Charnon (2012) for a complete review of HFACS and its use in Coast Guard aviation 
mishap trend analysis following the 2003 organizational move from Department of 
Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security.    
Further review of Coast Guard Class A flight mishaps shows that 18 mishap 
reports directly cited or inferred a breakdown or lack of CRM among flight 
crewmembers. (B. A. Potter, personal communication, March 1, 2013).  A review of the 
eight most recent Coast Guard Class A flight mishap administrative investigations 
(FY06-FY12) reveals that seven of the mishaps contain specific CRM failures (Allen, 
2009; Brice-O’Hara, 2012; Currier, 2013; Neffenger, 2012 & 2013; Pearson, 2009; 
Salerno, 2012).  Despite training CRM tenets to flight crews, CRM failures continue to 
occur in Coast Guard cockpits. 
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aviation, a comparable maritime service to the U.S. 
Coast Guard, experienced similar CRM-related failure rates among cockpit flight crews.  
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ seven CRM critical skills are similar to the Coast 
Guard’s:  (a) mission analysis, (b) leadership, (c) risk management, (d) decision making, 
(e) situational awareness, (f) adaptability/flexibility, (g) communications, and (f) 
assertiveness (U.S. Navy, 2011).  Examining Naval Aviation Class A mishaps, Jones 
(2009) found 69% of rotary wing and tactical jet aircraft accidents from 1997 to 2007 
listed CRM failure as one of the accident causal factor.   
However, Wilson-Donnelly and Shappell (2004) found a mismatch between the 




U.S. Navy and Marine Corps accidents between 1990 and 2000, Wilson-Donnelly and 
Shappell found six major CRM failure groupings: (a) failure to conduct adequate 
briefing, (b) failure to utilize resources, (c) lack of communication, (d) 
miscommunication, (e) failure to monitor, and (f) failure to backup/assist.  Wilson-
Donnelly and Shappell believe the six major CRM failure groupings indicate a 
misalignment between the CRM critical skills taught to flight crews and the type of CRM 
failures actually occurring in U.S. Navy and Marine Corps cockpits.  An analysis of the 
seven Coast Guard Flight A flight mishaps containing specific CRM failures show at 
least one of the six Wilson-Donnelly and Shappell CRM failure groupings occurring in 
all mishaps.  More interesting is the fact that failing to backup and assist other flight 
crewmembers occurred in six mishaps, suggesting a misalignment between Coast Guard 
CRM training and actual cockpit CRM failures similar to the U.S. Navy and Marine 
Corps finding by Wilson-Donnelly and Shappell (2004). 
Human Error 
Human error is the failure to achieve desired consequences or planned actions 
leading to unintended consequences and accidents (Maurino, Reason, Johnston, & Lee, 
1995; Reason, 1990a).  Major accidents in complex systems such as nuclear power 
plants, marine and rail transport, chemical process plants, off-shore oil platforms, and 
commercial aviation can be linked to human error (Reason, 1990b).  Humans performing 
in cognitively demanding real world situations often find themselves facing complex and 
uncertain situations (Cook et al., 2004).  Well-known accidents, e.g. Three Mile Island; 
Chernobyl; Challenger; Exxon Valdez; and more recently, the 2009 Air France Flight 




human failures in complex technologies and sociotechnical systems (Reason, 1990a; 
Zolli, 2012).  A review of 37 significant safety operating events at commercial nuclear 
power plants show human error contributed significantly to nearly all events (Gertman et 
al., 2001).  The health care system is at least a decade behind to other high-risk industries 
in basic safety, and human error results in as many as 98,000 deaths each year exceeding 
that of motor-vehicle accidents, breast cancer, and AIDS (National Research Council, 
2000).  Human error costs hospitals nationwide $17 billion to $29 billion per year 
(National Research Council, 2000).  According to Davies (2001), the medical community 
is slow to recognize the universal role of human error and is continually pressured to 
perform without error. 
  From 1960s to the 1990s, human error in hazardous systems increased fourfold 
and now represents approximately 80-90% of all major accidents (Maurino et al., 1995; 
Reason, 1997).  According to Flin et al. (2008), errors in human non-technical skills have 
played a major role in serious nuclear power plant incidents such as Three Mile Island 
and Chernobyl.  Since 1979, human error has occurred in 14 of the major maritime, 
military, police, healthcare, petrochemical, transport and aviation accidents (Flin et al., 
2008).  Of those 14 major industry accidents, teamwork and team coordination failures 
were major contributors in seven of the accidents (Flin et al., 2008).  However, Reason 
(1997) cautions using the broad label of human error since it may misrepresent how and 
why accidents actually occurred and fails to acknowledge the human contribution to 
safety by those frontline professionals operating in complex organizational systems.  
Hollnagel (2012) further argues that neither simple nor complex linear thinking is 




that recent accidents like the Challenger explosion and Chernobyl meltdown emphasize 
the need to recognize non-technical aspects of sociotechnical systems. 
Simple Cause and Effect Linear Sequencing of Human Error 
A simple cause and effect linear sequencing perspective promotes the view that 
human error is an aspect of human performance that is substandard or flawed (Woods, 
Dekker, Cook, Johannesen, & Sarter, 2010).  Simply stated, the label of human error in 
accident analysis infers that 1) human performance immediately prior the accident was 
flawed, and 2) inadequate human performance directly attributed to the accident (Woods 
et al., 2010).  According to Woods et al., the common belief is that human performance is 
distinctly separate from the represented system, and errors occur either within the human 
side or within the represented system.  Separating the human from the system enforces 
the idea that human error is correctable by changing the behaviors of individuals 
operating within the system (Woods et al., 2010).  With simple linear cause and effect 
perspective, human error is avoidable and a product of human cognition defects 
(Maurino, 1999; Reason, 2008).  Eliminating the error (cause) will eliminate the accident 
(effect).  
According to Reason (2008), believing that human error is avoidable promotes a 
human-as-hazard perspective.  Human-as-hazard advocates believe that highly trained 
frontline professionals have a moral obligation to care and avoid making errors (Reason, 
2008) and that human errors are a result of carelessness; inattention; distraction; or the 
lack of skill, vigilance, or conscientiousness (Dismukes et al., 2007).  The human-as-




contributor to accidents and that “complex systems would be fine, were it not for the 
erratic behavior of some unreliable people (bad apples) in it” (Dekker, 2006, p. 1).   
Complex Cause and Effect Linear Sequencing of Human Error 
According to Dismukes et al. (2007), accidents usually involve human 
performance characteristics and their complex interaction with task demands, 
environment condition and events, and social and organizational influences.  Reason 
(1990a) argues that social and organizational factors lead to accidents because of 
weaknesses or gaps in a complex system.  Reason’s (1990a, 1997) Swiss Cheese Model  
portrays the sequence of holes in organizational defenses attributed to active failures and 
latent conditions which eventually line up, allowing an accident trajectory through the 
layers of defense.   
According to Wiegman and Shappell (2003), Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model 
provides the unifying theoretical framework for integrating all human error perspectives 
but argue that the Swiss Cheese Model is too theoretical in nature and “as a result, 
analysts, investigators, and other safety professionals have had a difficult time applying 
Reason’s [(1990a, 1997)] model to the real world” (p. 50).  Wiegman and Shappell 
(2003) believe the Swiss Cheese Model is primarily descriptive and argue that their 
HFACS provides the analytical tool for accident investigation and determining human 
error latent conditions and active failures.  However, Wilson et al. (2007) believe that 
despite human error classification frameworks such as HFACS, labeling human error as a 
root cause of an accident is “too broad and leaves much to one’s imagination as to what 
really occurred” (p. 246).  Similarly, Diehl (1997) argues that human error is easy to 




According to Hollnagel (2012), determining human error resulting from 
technological, psychological, environmental, and organizational influences represents 
complex sequence-of-events linear thinking implying both order and cause and effect.  
Using sequence-of-events linear thinking for determining human error in accident 
investigations does little to explain the complex nature of systems in which accidents 
occur.  Sequence-of-events cause and effect investigations promote the human-as-hazard 
view by attributing accident causes to human mistakes, deficient supervision, ineffective 
leadership, lack of appropriate rules and procedures, or some deficiencies in human or 
represented system performance (Woods et al., 2010).  According to Hollnagel, simple 
and complex sequence-of-events linear thinking investigations attempt to identify human 
error actions in accidents based on future outcomes yet to be determined when the human 
error action occurred.  Sequence-of-events linear thinking fosters hindsight bias which 
fosters a cause-consequence equivalence (Dekker, 2006).  Dekker further argues that 
hindsight bias turns convoluted complexity into a simple, linear story and oversimplifies 
the events which actually occurred and destroys the ability to look objectively at past 
events judged as human error.   
Complexity of Sociotechnical Theoretical Perspective of Human Error 
Today’s sociotechnical systems are highly complex and involve the interaction of 
humans and technology to deliver results from the human-machine collaboration.  
Sociotechnical systems contain people and equipment and operate within social systems 
of organizational goals, policies, and procedures (Harris, 2011; Qureshi, 2008).   
Sociotechnical systems also contain legal, political, cultural, and environment 




systems is an “inevitable by-product of the pursuit of success in an imperfect, unstable, 
resource-constrained world” (p. 65).  Dekker (2006) believes that complex sociotechnical 
systems do not exist to be safe, but on the contrary, they exist to make money, render a 
service, or provide a product.  Accidents in complex sociotechnical systems such as 
nuclear power plants, marine and rail transport, chemical process plants, and commercial 
aviation are inevitable because those systems are high-risk and intrinsically hazardous 
(Cook et al., 2004; Perrow, 1999).  Because sociotechnical systems are highly complex 
and intrinsically hazardous, accidents normally represent failures in adapting to systems’ 
complexity and interactions instead of human performance failures (Hollnagel, 2012).   
Researchers suggest humans create safety in sociotechnical systems (Cook et al., 
2004; Dekker, 2006; Reason, 1997, 2008).  Cook et al. (2004) argue that in 
sociotechnical systems, humans continuously create safety by adapting to changing 
conditions moment to moment.  Reason (2008) identifies the ability to adapt to changing 
conditions as human variability and argues for its necessity for safeguarding imperfect 
systems in an uncertain and dynamic world.  Safety is created predominantly by human 
resilience and flexibility (Dekker, 2006).  According to Hollnagel (2012), sociotechnical 
systems are enhanced by the ability of humans to respond, monitor, learn, and anticipate.   
Opposed to having safety, humans do safety in sociotechnical systems.  Humans do 
safety by continually assessing and revising performance that is sensitive to the 
possibility of failure and by knowing and monitoring risk boundaries (Woods et al., 
2010).  Humans create safety because, unlike computers, they are equipped to make 
rational decisions in novel situations when information is incomplete, contradicting, 




contribution to creating safety in complex, intrinsically unsafe sociotechnical systems as 
the “human-as-hero” perspective and argues that frontline professionals (e.g. nuclear 
power plant operators, commercial pilots) often represent the last line of defense against 
major accidents.    
Human Error in Aviation  
Since the early days of powered flight, the human-machine interface has proven 
to be the most challenging aspects of human flight (Hobbs, 2004).  Despite increased 
safety through technology and aviation system improvements, human error remains the 
primary cause of aviation accidents and loss of life (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; 
Dismukes et al., 2007; Flin et al., 2008).  From 1959 to 1980, flight crew error was the 
primary cause of 76% of aircraft accidents among the worldwide commercial jet fleet, 
and from 1981 to 1990, flight crew error was the primary cause of 70.5% of aircraft 
accidents among the worldwide commercial jet fleet (Weener, 1992).  However, during 
the same period of time, aircraft malfunctions were responsible for only 11% of all 
commercial aviation accidents (Weener, 1992).    
According to Darby (2006), from 1996 to 2005, 55% of all aircraft accidents were 
caused by crew error.  Darby is quick to note that the recent reduction of crew error in 
aircraft accidents is likely due to changes in weather reporting, Air Traffic Control, and 
aircraft maintenance reporting procedures.  Some argue that improvements to aircraft 
materials, aviation engineering techniques, and weather reporting procedures have not 
increased human error in aviation per se, but instead have brought the role of human error 
in aircraft accidents into greater prominence (Fraher, 2011; Reason, 2008).  Hobbs (2004) 




Transport Safety Bureau data of aircraft accidents in the early 20th century, the author 
found that pilot error contributed to nearly 70% of accidents.  Hobbs argues human error 
has been a flight safety issue since the early days of aviation.  Whether human error is a 
recent phenomenon or existing since the early days of aviation, Wells (2001) believes 
that human error by cockpit flight crews represents the single greatest threat to flight 
safety in today’s commercial aviation.    
Human error in aviation, specifically in the cockpit environment, is traditionally 
labeled “pilot error.”  However, according to Diehl (1997), the term pilot error focuses 
the blame of the accident instead of identifying and finding solutions to the problem.  
Dekker (2006) believes assigning human error to aircraft mishaps often leads to a 
dangerous, single-minded view that focuses the blame solely on the pilot who committed 
the error rather than constructing the underlying causes of error.  According to Dismukes 
et al. (2007), aircraft accidents involve “a complex interaction of inherent human 
performance characteristics with task demands, environmental events and conditions, and 
social and organizational factors” (p. 300).  
Human error in aviation exists because, like other complex sociotechnical 
systems, the aviation system is inherently unsafe and represents a continual contradiction 
between operational efficiency and safety (Dekker, 2006).  There is a natural tendency to 
believe the aviation system is inherently safe and that the people operating in the system 
are unreliable and subject to deviations causing aircraft accidents (Pelegrin, 2013).   
Dismukes et al. (2007) suggest that inappropriate actions or omissions by flight crews are 
many times cited as probable causes only because of their proximity to aircraft accident 




Human Error in Flight Crew Non-technical Skills 
In the 1970s, aviation psychologists and accident investigators at the NASA-
Ames Research Center began exploring broader human factors issues associated with 
flight operations (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010).  Based on simple linear thinking cause 
and effect accident investigations, flight crew human factors data seem to point to 
inadequacies in non-technical skills such as team communication, coordination, workload 
management, situational awareness, task allocation, and resource utilization for safe 
flight operations.  At the same time, a series of fatal commercial airline accidents caused 
by the lack of communication, coordination, and backup behavior between the aircraft 
flight crews accented the need for pilot training that is more non-technical and 
psychosocial in nature. 
In 1978, United Airlines Flight #173 experienced a total breakdown of situational 
awareness and communication near Portland, Oregon, when flight crewmembers failed to 
comprehend a critical fuel state and successfully communicate their concern with the 
captain (Kanki, 2010; NTSB, 1979).  The aircraft crashed after running out of fuel in 
flight (NTSB, 1979).  Four years later, a lack of flight crew communication, coupled with 
improper engine anti-icing procedures before takeoff and weather departure delays, 
resulted in Air Florida Flight #90 crashing into the Potomac River immediately after 
takeoff from Washington National Airport (NTSB, 1982).  In fact, when the aircraft was 
stalling, an aerodynamic condition where the aircraft wings fail to produce enough lift 
required to maintain flight, the pilots failed to verbalize anything prompting a stall 
recovery response even though both were fully qualified in stall recovery procedures 




Six years later in 1988, Delta Airlines Flight #1141 crashed on takeoff after 
failing to follow checklist procedures and configuring the aircraft flaps for takeoff 
(NTSB, 1989).  The accident investigation revealed that the first officer became 
distracted with an extended social conversation with an on-board flight attendant during 
taxi prior to takeoff (NTSB, 1989).  Though the captain did not extensively participate in 
the conversation, he failed to “control the group processes and did not establish work 
priorities or demonstrate a concern for operational duties” required for safe flight 
(Helmreich & Foushee, 2010, p. 23).     
Foushee (1984) notes that crew redundancy in an aviation multipiloted cockpit is 
necessary to improve the safety margin, but argues this safety margin diminishes when 
captains fail to heed the warnings of other crewmembers and when crewmembers fail to 
provide the necessary and timely backup.  Citing a NASA study by Cooper, White, and 
Lauber, Foushee (1984) agrees with the hazards of crew performance processes 
breakdowns and suggests that crew coordination factors should receive more aviation 
research and training attention.     
A NASA research project originally designed to investigate individual pilot 
vigilance, workload, and response to stress providentially brought a new clarity to the 
reoccurring team communication and coordination failures among flight crew (Ruffell 
Smith, 1979).  According to Helmreich and Foushee (2010), Ruffell Smith’s flight crew 
interaction study demonstrates the operational significance of crew interactions.  The 
primary conclusion of the study is that human errors are a result of breakdowns in crew 




leadership directly affects the timely exchange of critical information during periods of 
work overload and task saturation (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010).   
Because of the NASA study, the accident investigators began looking at human 
error in team processes and team effectiveness among flight crews using linear sequence-
of-event accident investigation methodology.  Flight safety was now focusing on 
understanding and promoting team communication and coordination processes in 
multipiloted cockpits.  Foushee (1984) suggests an early challenge in cockpits was 
shifting from “The Right Stuff” traditional pilot mentality of self-reliant, macho, and 
decisive, characterized by the Tom Wolfe novel, to a professional pilot culture stressing 
cockpit team effectiveness (Wolfe, 1979).   
Crew Resource Management  
Early attempts to improve flight team processes was initially called Cockpit 
Resource Management with roots dating back to a 1979 NASA conference exploring the 
causes of commercial airline accidents (Orlady & Foushee, 1987).  Helmreich et al. 
(1999) believe that many of the commercial air carriers attending the conference left 
“committed to developing new training programs to enhance the interpersonal aspects of 
flight operations” (p. 19).  Lauber (1987), a NTSB researcher present at the 1979 NASA 
conference, defined Cockpit Resource Management as “the effective utilization of all 
available resources—hardware, software, and liveware—to achieve safe, efficient flight 
operations” (p. 9).  Liveware refers to the flight crewmembers performing cockpit team 
functions.  Cockpit Resource Management became a systematic approach to improving 
aviation safety by training flight crews on leadership, human performance, 




(2011), the advent of CRM introduced social psychology and management to the cockpit 
environment.  The cockpit work environment shifted from traditional "stick and rudder" 
skills to a managing the flight crew in a highly automated aircraft environment 
(Helmreich & Foushee, 2010).  Flight crew management included complex human capital 
skills such as judgment, problem solving, social relationships, personality, motivation, 
communication, and coordination. 
According to Salas, Wilson, Burke, Wightman, and Howse (2006a), CRM is a 
common instructional strategy for team training.  Citing Orasanu, Martin, and Davison 
(2001), Dekker (2006) believes that effective CRM contains the following:   
• Shared understanding of the situation, the nature of the problem, the cause of 
the problem, the meaning of available cues, and what is likely to happen in the 
future, with or without action by the teams members; 
• Shared understanding of the goal or desired outcome; 
• Shared understanding of the solution strategy; what will be done, by whom, 
when, and why? (p. 129) 
History of CRM Training 
 Early CRM training was in response to the human as hazard theoretical 
perspective of human error and focused on improving flight crew attitudes, leadership, 
and communications using psychological testing and interpersonal behavior training 
(Helmreich et al., 1999; Maurino & Murray, 2010).  The goal of CRM training was 
changing attitudes toward cockpit group interaction and flight crew management.  




such as the lack of assertiveness by copilots and dictatorial personalities of captains 
(Helmreich et al., 1999).   
The NTSB made its first direct reference to CRM in accident report 
recommendations after the 1978 United Airlines flight #173 crash near Portland, Oregon 
(NTSB, 1979).  The NTSB recommendations specifically asked the FAA to urge all air 
carriers to instruct their crewmembers on flight deck resource management principles 
with “particular emphasis on the merits of participative management for captains and 
assertiveness training for other cockpit crewmembers” (NTSB, 1979, p. 30).  Over the 
next few years, NTSB accident investigation reports continued to recommend applying 
the findings of CRM research to commercial pilot training programs in an effort to reduce 
cockpit human error.  
By the mid-1980s, commercial airlines embraced CRM and incorporated team 
communication and coordination principles into their pilot training programs.  A jointly 
sponsored NASA/U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command CRM conference in 1987 
validated the spread of the CRM training throughout commercial and military aviation 
(Orlady & Foushee, 1987).  Cockpit crew team building, briefing strategies, situation 
awareness, the management of crew stress, and crew decision-making principles were 
becoming part of CRM training. (Helmreich et al., 1999; Maurino & Murray, 2010).  The 
new emphasis on cockpit group dynamics and team-oriented training led to the renaming 
of CRM to Crew Resource Management…a label that still exists today.  According to 
Maurino and Murray, early CRM efforts purposefully maintained a clear separation 
between aviation technical skills, i.e. flying the aircraft, and flight crew non-technical 




Beginning in the early 1990s, CRM non-technical skills were integrated with 
flight crew technical training (FAA, 1991).  This integration, coupled with the 
introduction of electro-optical instrument displays (glass cockpits), led to CRM training 
components focusing on small team cognitive applications, human performance, and the 
human-machine interface (Maurino & Murray, 2010).  According to Maurino and 
Murray, a major step forward in CRM non-technical and technical training integration 
was an underlying paradigm shift in aviation safety from reactive to proactive and the 
integration of vigilance and human reliability.   
In 1993, the FAA published initial guidance on developing, implementing, 
reinforcing, and assessing CRM training.  Distributed as Advisory Circular 120-51 and 
nearly ten years after the introduction of CRM, the circular was the FAA’s first attempt to 
define how CRM programs play a role in air carrier training and operations (Farrow, 
2010; Wilson, Guthrie, Salas, & Howse, 2010).  Advisory Circular 120-51 (1993) states 
the mission of CRM training is to “prevent aviation accidents by improving crew 
performance through better crew coordination” (p. 4), and suggests CRM curriculum 
topics of communication processes, decision making, and team building.  However, the 
theoretical basis for FAA CRM guidance was optimizing human performance by 
reducing human error.  
By the late 1990s, CRM training began reflecting influence of management 
actions or inactions, organizational synergy, flight crew interaction, and shared mental 
models (Maurino & Murray, 2010).  By the end of the 20th century, researchers began 
questioning the intended results of CRM training.  Helmreich et al. (1999) suggest that on 




fundamental part of all flight training but argue that the initial overarching rationale of 
reducing crew-based human error had been lost.  Early CRM training efforts attempted to 
train specific flight crew behaviors for increasing flight safety, but the focus of early 
CRM generations was imperfect by attempting to eliminate human error (Maurino, 1999; 
Helmreich et al., 1999).   
Threat and Error Management  
Human error is ubiquitous and inevitable and a result of the natural limitations of 
human performance in complex systems and forms the basis for threat and error 
management introduced to CRM training in the late 1990s (Helmreich et al., 1999).  The 
goal of CRM threat and error management is the trapping and mitigating of errors within 
the aviation system before they become consequential (Helmreich & Merritt, 2000).  
Advocates of threat and error management believe that flight crew CRM behaviors 
should evaluate external and internal threats then determine corrective actions (Helmreich 
et al., 2001).  The management of threats and errors provides a contextual framework that 
defines CRM skills as error countermeasures (Maurino & Murray, 2010).  Kontogiannis 
and Malakis (2009) recognize that elimination of human error is difficult to achieve and 
that many times errors are associated with adverse consequences in complex situations 
involving high workload and high stress decision making.  Therefore, the essence of 
CRM threat and error management is not the prevention of human error but the stopping 
of adverse consequences through the detection and correction of errors (Kontogiannis & 
Malakis, 2009).  Although many commercial and military aviation CRM programs have 




management programs are ineffective in helping flight crews innovate, increase situation 
awareness, develop shared mental models, and enhance cockpit teamwork.   
Human Error Theoretical Perspective for CRM Training 
 From the beginning, the goal of CRM in aviation was increasing team 
effectiveness by eliminating communication and coordination errors among cockpit flight 
crews.  Originally created to increase communication between non-assertive copilots and 
captains with strong personalities and leadership styles, flight crew CRM training 
programs evolved to include other non-technical skills such as situational awareness, risk 
management, and decision-making.  By 2000, CRM training incorporated threat and error 
management attempting to recognize the inevitability of human error in the cockpit. 
Threat and error management remains prevalent in aviation CRM training programs 
today.  
CRM in U.S. Military Aviation  
Aviation CRM training in the U.S. military is a direct result of commercial 
aviation CRM programs starting a decade earlier (O’Conner, Hahn, & Nullmeyer, 2010).   
By 1989, and following commercial carrier CRM training models, each service (Army, 
Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps) had at least one CRM program among various 
squadrons and aviation units (Prince & Salas, 1993).  Prince and Salas believe that CRM 
may have developed more slowly within the military than in commercial aviation because 
of the lack of aviation human error evidence, the organizational makeup of each service, 
the variety of missions and training requirements of each service, and the absence of 
public pressure associated with the loss of multiple lives with commercial carrier wide-




aircrew coordination training, the overall purpose was similar to commercial aviation 
efforts (Prince & Salas, 1993).   
Cavanaugh and Williams (1987) believe that CRM principles are applicable to 
both military and commercial cockpit flight crews.  However, Cavanaugh and Williams 
suggest that significant differences exist between military and commercial cockpit flight 
crews and caution against applying generic CRM training solutions to both.  Cavanaugh 
and Williams sum these significant differences into six main categories:  1) impact of 
military rank; 2) purpose of the aviation mission; 3) crew qualifications differences with 
commercial aviation flight crews; 4) crew lifestyle and aviation job requirements; 5) 
absence of union and employee/employer relationships; and 6) other differences 
including training, crew communication, and flight crew protocol.  Prince and Salas 
(1993) believe that the differences between commercial and military aviation identified 
by Cavanaugh and Williams (1987) fall under three general categories: (a) task (aviation 
mission requirement, flying conditions, and equipment); (b) people (flight crew makeup 
and experience); and (c) organization (military cockpit and organization structure 
differences).      
O’Conner et al. (2010) suggest that factors such as mission timing constraints, 
multiple unit coordination, and pilot workload represent stark differences between 
commercial air carriers and military operations.  O’Conner et al. (2010) argue that CRM-
related mishaps occur three times more often in military aviation than in commercial 
aviation and that the focus on mission accomplishment, the frequent changing jobs and 
military assignments, and the non-homogenous nature of the military aviation units, 




Despite differences between military and commercial aviation, U.S. military services 
embraced CRM training when research suggested that enhancing flight crew coordination 
and communications improves mission effectiveness and flight safety (See Prince & 
Salas, 1993 and O’Conner et al., 2010 for a review of U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps CRM programs). 
CRM in U.S. Coast Guard Aviation 
Aviation CRM training is required for all Coast Guard flight crews (U.S. Coast 
Guard, 2013).  Coast Guard flight crews receive CRM training prior to aircraft flight 
training.  The goal of the training is improving the performance of individuals and 
teamwork with the following objectives:   
1. Determining and analyzing personality traits as they relate to aircrew 
interaction and problem solving. 
2. Improving interpersonal skills and crew communications. 
3. Developing and improving participation as an individual and 
crewmember in a positive and assertive manner. 
4. Developing and enhancing individual and crew situational awareness 
skills. 
5. Identifying hazardous trends and attitudes through analysis of past 
human error mishaps.  
6. Presenting a risk management methodology that can help individuals 
and crews identify error producing conditions and prevent or mitigate 
hazardous situations. 




8. Recognition of the effects of illness, medications, diet, fatigue, and 
other self-imposed stressors on in-flight performance.  
 (U.S. Coast Guard, 2014a, p. 20-3) 
Initial CRM training occurs at ATC Mobile for Coast Guard pilots attending their 
Coast Guard aircraft qualification course.  Refresher CRM training occurs 
annually at Coast Guard Air Stations for pilots who have completed initial CRM 
training (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  
History of Coast Guard CRM Training 
Coast Guard CRM training has similar roots to CRM training in other military 
services.  In fact, Lieutenant Commander R. Wharton, representing Coast Guard aviation 
safety, attended the 1979 joint NASA/MAC conference in San Francisco (Orlady & 
Foushee, 1987).  Coast Guard CRM training began in the early 1990s focusing on team 
communication and coordination skills for multipiloted aircraft using a training program 
commercially contracted by the U.S. Army (Prince & Salas, 1993).  It was the Coast 
Guard’s first attempt to leverage commercially available CRM material and training.  
However, one major concern was non-Coast Guard aspects of the training and a need for 
Coast Guard-focused specific training.  In 1994, Coast Guard aviation safety began 
building an “in-house” CRM training solution using Coast Guard aviation instructors (T. 
M. McGuire, personal communication, April 26, 2013).  By the late 1990s, training on 
foundational CRM skills was mandated for all Coast Guard pilots and aircrew.  By 1998, 
Coast Guard Flight Safety Officers assigned to local aviation units were trained and 
authorized to teach CRM training.  At first, Coast Guard CRM training was required 




flexibility and the opportunity for new flight crewmembers to obtain operational 
experience prior to CRM training.   
Initially, the goal of Coast Guard CRM training was the optimal team 
performance in a complex multiple task environment through the training of four basic 
principles: (a) situational awareness; (b) communications; (c) assertiveness; and (d) risk 
management.  Aviation instructors also taught common obstructions to the four basic 
principles, known as roadblocks, attempting to improve flight crew team effectiveness. 
Roadblocks to CRM are negative, ingrained habits, and personal attitudes of flight 
crewmembers such as “odd man out,” “hidden agenda,” and “hazardous attitudes” (U.S. 
Coast Guard, n.d.-a).  The four basic principles and roadblocks represented the core of 
Coast Guard CRM training throughout the 1990s.  Aspects of error management 
(Helmreich et al., 2001) based on the Swiss cheese model (Reason, 1990a, 1997) were 
incorporated by 2002 in an attempt to align Coast Guard CRM training with emerging 
research in cockpit human error.  Coast Guard flight crew training focused on error 
management, the four basic CRM principles, and common roadblocks to effective CRM 
in the aircraft.   
Coast Guard Enhanced CRM 
In 2007, Coast Guard aviation safety and training representatives participated in a 
CRM symposium  jointly hosted by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU); 
aircraft manufacturer Bombardier; and Frasca, the makers of flight training equipment for 
airlines and various flight schools and military organizations, (C. Bonner, personal 
communication, January 30, 2013).  Called ERAU: CRM Vectors 2007,  the two-fold 




practice and predicting the future of CRM training (Beneigh & Hubbard, 2007).  One of 
the major defined themes was the training and evaluation of CRM.  It was from the 
ERAU: CRM Vectors 2007 conference that the Coast Guard began exploring the 
feasibility of a comprehensive revision of its CRM training program.  Concerns had 
grown that CRM training in the Coast Guard had become “a mere check in the box” 
without utilizing the latest design, development, implementation and evaluation 
techniques (D. R. Callahan, personal communication, June 19, 2007). 
By 2008, the Coast Guard out-sourced the revamping of its CRM training for 
pilots and flight crews.  Known as “Enhanced CRM”, the curriculum incorporates the 
latest CRM principles and concepts of University of Central Florida Institute for 
Simulation and Training, ERAU, the European Joint Aviation Authority, and 
Helmreich’s University of Texas Aerospace Crew Resource Project (D. R. Callahan, 
personal communication, June 19, 2007).   
Major components of Enhanced CRM are the concepts of airmanship and flight 
discipline (Kern, 1997, 1998).  Airmanship consists of three fundamental principles: skill, 
proficiency, and discipline.  Total airmanship “blends technical and tactical expertise, 
[pilot] proficiency, and the variety of human factors to smoothly and effectively integrate 
the capabilities of the pilot and the machine” (Kern, 1998, p. 8).  Kern (1997) suggests 
that total airmanship improves situation awareness, reduces human error, and increases 
operational effectiveness.   
Using an airmanship model, Kern (1998) identifies the personal accountability 
and reliability foundation of flight discipline and the interconnectedness of pilot skill, 




Kern’s (1997, 1998) airmanship and flight discipline constructs attempt to improve 
aviation safety by improving aviation compliance and accident prevention at the 
individual professional pilot level.  Kern (1998) argues that the organizational system or 
training approach used in the traditional CRM has not produced the desired results of 
reducing human error.  Moreover, an individual approach of personal accountability and 
mental readiness is needed to “identify and predict their own personal error patterns 
[which are] based on their unique lives and circumstances” (Kern, 2008, p. 147).  
Identifying the conditions leading to errors and violations, Kern (2008) further argues 
that flight crews must learn to identify their personal error-producing conditions and 
work offensively to mitigate and ultimately reduce and/or prevent them.  Enhanced CRM 
maintains that aircraft accidents are avoidable by reducing the number of individual 
human errors (U. S. Coast Guard, n.d.-b).    
Summary of Coast Guard CRM 
Coast Guard CRM has followed the developmental path of both commercial and 
military aviation efforts and in the beginning used the same contractor outsourcing 
support for flight crew training as the U.S. Army (T. M. McGuire, personal 
communication, April 26, 2013).  The basic principles of situational awareness, 
communications, assertiveness, leadership, risk management, and decision-making have 
remained Coast Guard CRM tenets since their introduction in the early 1990s.  Threat 
and error management was introduced in the early 2000s, and flight crews were taught to 
evaluate external and internal threats and determine corrective actions (Helmreich et al., 
1999; Helmreich et al., 2001; Helmreich & Merritt, 2000).  The recent overhaul of the 




crew situational awareness; reduce errors; and increase operational effectiveness by using 
flight discipline, skills, and proficiency with a thorough knowledge of one’s self, aircraft, 
team environment, and risk.  However, Coast Guard Enhanced CRM training continues 
to align with the theoretical perspective that human error can be reduced and possibly 
eliminated.     
CRM Skills 
Researchers (Flin & Martin, 2001; Helmreich & Foushee, 1993) suggest CRM 
skills commonly follow two primary clusters:  social skills and cognitive skills.  Social 
skills represent the interaction between pilots and/or crew through communication and 
coordination.  Cognitive tasks are the individual tasks that flight crewmembers use to 
operate in the aviation environment and deal with how the pilot thinks and processes 
information.  Cognitive CRM skills include monitoring, crosschecking, problem solving, 
and making decisions. 
Early CRM training focused on increasing flight crew communication and 
coordination.  Lauber (1987) credits American Airlines as the first to identify CRM skills 
for flight crews:  (a) delegation of tasks and assignment of responsibilities, (b) 
establishment of priorities, (c) monitoring and crosschecking, (d) use of information, (e) 
problem assessment and the avoidance of preoccupation, (f) communications, and (g) 
leadership.  Flight crew skills identified by early CRM training developers seem to 
address the initial human error failures of lack of assertiveness by copilots and dictatorial 




By the early 1990s, researchers were identifying CRM critical skills and 
expanding on American Airlines’ initial CRM skills list.  Table 2 shows the skills 
suggested by researchers which became the foundation for most aviation CRM training.  
Table 2 
Studies Defining Crew Resource Management Critical Skills 
Orlady & Foushee 
(1987) 
Helmreich & Foushee 
(1993) 
Prince & Salas 
(1993) 




Decision tasks Decision making 
Leadership/Followership Team formation Leadership 
Interpersonal skills Management tasks Assertiveness 





Stress management  Adaptability 
 
 Similar to commercial aviation, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force researchers 
began defining CRM critical skills in the early 1990s (O’Conner et al., 2010).  According 
to O’Conner et al., United States military CRM training focuses on skills relevant to 
military flight operation demands, and those defined skills have become the groundwork 
for military services throughout the world.   
Though the CRM critical skills are highly similar, each program is unique to 
requirements for the particular service.  Table 3 shows the CRM critical skills currently 





CRM Critical Skills in U.S. Military Services 
U.S. Navy U.S. Army U.S. Air Force U.S. Coast Guard 
Communication Communication Communication Communication 
Decision making Decision making Risk Management Decision making 















Mission Analysis Risk Management 
Adaptability   Cockpit Automation 
   Flight Physiology 
 
  Though CRM training is well rooted in United States military aviation training 
today, with the exception of aspects of threat and error management (Helmreich et al., 
1999; Helmreich & Merritt, 2000), the critical skills identified in the early 1990s are still 
taught to military aviators.  Military CRM experts believe that identified CRM critical 
skills have remained relatively unchanged since the beginning (R. G. Hahn, personal 
communication, October 6, 2013).    
 Teamwork  
 Teamwork is a major contributor to business organizational goals and process 
improvement (Swanson & Holton, 2009).  According to Salas (2005), 80% of today’s 




globalization, emerging technology and safety issues demand that teams operate 
effectively in competitive environments (Salas, 2005).  In addition, high-risk complex 
environments require flexibility and responsiveness among individual experts/specialists 
operating in teams (Flin et al., 2008).   
As sociotechnical systems become increasingly complex and produce conditions 
for human error, teamwork within the system and the role of each team member is 
essential (Fraher, 2011).  Researchers investigating the role of individual skills on team 
performance believe that individual task proficiencies alone are not sufficient to ensure 
effectiveness team performance (Delise, Gorman, Brooks, Rentsch, & Steele-Johnson, 
2010; Salas, Bowers, & Cannon-Bowers, 1995; Stout, Salas, & Carson, 1994).   
Successful team performance requires a specific set of knowledge, skills, and attitudes 
(KSAs) at the team level for successful mission completion (Oser, et al., 2000).  Delise et 
al. (2010) argue that team members must develop teamwork skills including 
understanding the unique roles performed by each member of the team and the 
interdependencies of those roles.      
Team Processes  
Wilson et al. (2007) believe that teamwork skills are cyclical in nature and act as 
processes, outcomes, and processes again.  Wilson et al. further suggest, “what serves as 
an outcome of one variable may serve as an input to another” (p. 247).  Marks et al. 
(2001) describe teamwork skills as processes in which team members’ interdependent 
actions change inputs to outcomes through verbal, cognitive, and behavioral activities.  
Team processes are important because they define how team contributions transform into 




interaction that take place among the team’s members (Marks et al., 2001).  Researchers 
(Flin et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2007) believe that communication is a teamwork process.  
Verbal communication is the primary way team processes manifest (Fraher, 2011; 
Helmreich & Foushee, 2010).  According to Flin et al., safety, productivity, quality, and 
job satisfaction are examples of team outcomes. 
Team CRM processes 
According to Flin et al. (2008), CRM training is a team-based strategy for helping  
individuals be more effective in team processes.  Salas et al. (2006a) believe that pilot 
training of team-based processes must go beyond individual skills and include how to use 
those team-based processes to improve team performance and safety.  Researchers (Flin 
et al., 2008; Kanki et al., 2010; Salas et al., 2006a) agree with earlier defined CRM 
teamwork processes of communication, leadership, decision-making, mission 
analysis/planning, and assertiveness but now recognize the team process of shared 
situation awareness through shared mental models and the team process of monitoring 
and backup behaviors.     
Mental Models 
Contemporary human-machine systems research has explored the role of 
individual mental models in human behavior and performance.  Realizing the 
nontransparent black box understanding of human mental models, Rouse and Morris 
(1985) propose, “mental models are the mechanisms whereby humans are able to 
generate descriptions of system purpose and form explanations of system functioning and 
observed system states, and predictions of future system states” (p. 7).  Agreeing with 




that are used to describe, explain and forecast situations.  Rouse and Morris (1985) 
believe that the successful search for mental models can result in substantial impacts to 
system design and training.   
Active mental models are important because they shape how we act toward 
people or situations and affect what we see, and proper use of mental models can make 
the difference between success and failure (Senge, 1990).  In management, proper mental 
models help organizations make good strategic business decisions which can achieve and 
enhance their competitive advantage.  Marsick and Watkins (1994) state that mental 
models are “deeply held cognitive, value-based, feeling-fraught frameworks people use to 
interpret situations they encounter [and that] people may or may not be aware of the 
models they use, let alone learn to test them” (p. 356).  Marsick and Watkins further 
argue that new mental models are needed for today’s business environment for work 
teams to innovate and retain the competitive edge. 
A mental model is a symbolic portrayal of conceptual information that exists 
within memory (Salas et al., 1995).  Mental models allow individuals to draw inferences, 
understand phenomena, and dictate action decisions (Mathieu et al., 2000).  Mental 
models construct expectations for the future by describing, explaining, and predicting 
events (Marks et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2000). Senge (1990) suggests that Schon’s 
(1983) reflective practice, i.e., the art of reflecting on one’s thinking, is a pragmatic 
example of a mental model.  Langan-Fox, Anglim, and Wilson (2004) describe mental 
models as simulations “run to produce qualitative and quantitative inferences, [which] 
underpin our understanding of a system, and allow us to describe, predict, and explain 




Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997) believe that in aviation, cockpit flight crewmembers use 
mental models for scanning cockpit instruments, monitoring aircraft automation, and 
establishing accurate expectations of the behavior of aircraft systems. 
Shared Mental Models 
Scientists now recognize that cognition is a social phenomenon and that 
individuals construct their reality cooperatively in a social environment (Klimoski & 
Mohammed, 1994).  A shared cognition construct among team members is the shared 
mental model (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 
1994).  Mathieu et al. (2005) define a shared mental model as an “organized 
understanding or mental representation of knowledge that is shared by team members” 
(p. 38).  The shared mental model construct is also known as team member schema 
agreement (Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001), shared cognition (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 
2001), team mental model (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Mohammed, Ferzandi, & 
Hamilton, 2010), team mutual awareness (MacMillan, Paley, Entin, & Entin, 2005), 
shared situation model (Orasanu, 1990, 2010), shared mindfulness (Krieger, 2005), and 
shared situational awareness (Salas et al., 2006b).   
  Team members must explain and forecast the actions of other team members and 
use shared mental models to do so (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1990; Cannon-
Bowers et al., 1993).  Scientists believe there is a positive relationship between shared 
mental models and team processes and performance (e.g., Marks et al., 2002; Marks et 
al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2005; Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001; Smith-
Jentsch et al., 2005; Waller et al., 2004; Zou & Lee, 2010).  Developing shared mental 




and predict the needs of other team members (Flin et al., 2008).  Shared mental models 
help team members share an understanding of the situation, and a common understanding 
of task responsibilities and task information requirements (Stout et al., 1999).  Shared 
mental models create an environment in which team members anticipate and foresee the 
needs of the other team members (Orasanu, 1994; Salas, Wilson, Burke, Wightman, & 
Howse, 2006b; Stout et al., 1999).  Wilson et al. (2007) argue that team coordination 
breakdowns and teams not sharing a common understanding of the situation lead to errors 
and missed steps or procedures.  On the other hand, team coordination mechanisms 
fostering shared cognition reduce the risk of errors and maintain or improve performance 
(Wilson et al., 2007).   
In training, developing accurate mental models improves performance outcomes. 
According to Johnson, Khalil, and Spector (2008), greater shared mental models translate 
into greater team capabilities, and team communication mediates the process of 
developing shared mental models.  Scientists found that in the naturalistic team setting of 
FAA Air Traffic Control towers, shared mental models facilitate teamwork (Smith-
Jentsch et al., 2005; Smith-Jentsch, Kraiger, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 2009). 
So what is “Shared” in Shared Mental Models?   
Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) argue that the term shared in team mental 
models “can refer to a cognitive representation that is identical among team members 
(e.g. common knowledge), a distributed configuration of representations (no overlap), or 
to a configuration of overlapping representations among group members” (p. 421). 
According to Mathieu et al. (2005), mental model “sharedness” is the consistency 




Mathieu et al. (2005) argue, “there is no ‘team model’ per se,” only individual mental 
models that are shared in a team (p. 38).  Sharedness is not aggregating individuals’ 
models to a team model but instead a merging that represents individuals sharing a 
common knowledge structures.   
Mohammed et al. (2010) believe that the organization of shared knowledge 
structures among team members remains at the core of the shared mental model construct 
and point to various terms used to describe sharedness including similarity, convergence, 
agreement, consensus, commonality, compatibility, overlap, and consistency.  Cannon-
Bowers et al. (1993) believe that most of time what is shared regarding team mental 
models is task dependent.  However, during dynamic situations requiring high levels of 
flexibility and adaptability, what is common among team members is each team 
member’s function to the team task (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993).   
Research supports the existence of both task and team shared mental models 
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Mathieu et al., 2005; 
Mathieu et al., 2000).  Task mental models represent what needs to be accomplished and 
include work goals and performance requirements whereas team mental models are how 
the work is accomplished among the team (Marks et al., 2001; Mohammed et al., 2010).  
Though team mental models focus on the team member’s interpersonal interaction 
requirements, task work mental models relate to team processes and team performance 
outcomes (Lim & Klein, 2006; Mathieu et al., 2005).    
Mohammed et al. (2010) argue that task and team mental model categories may 
be too generic to describe content-specific knowledge requirements adequately.  Recent 




models are best explained as complementing each other.  Sperling and Pritchett (2011) 
argue,  
the measure of a shared mental model is not whether each team member’s mental 
model is similar to each other’s, but rather whether each one’s mental model 
corresponds to the individuals’ tasks and collectively are complementary, with 
each team member knowing which information is known by the other team 
member should he or she need to seek it, and which information is needed from 
them to other team members and when. (p. 395) 
Whether shared mental models between team members are described as similar, 
common, task-related, team-related, or complementary, the critical inference is that teams 
possess shared mental models that lead to common expectations and allow team members 
to anticipate the needs of other team members and respond when appropriate and 
necessary. 
Shared Mental Models in High Tempo and Dynamic Environments 
Flin et al. (2008) believe that teams working under high levels of workload and in 
dynamic environments are able to coordinate and adapt to changing demands using 
shared mental models.  Entin and Serfaty (1999) suggest that high-performing teams use 
shared mental models to anticipate the situation developments and the needs of other 
team members when timely, error-free, and clear information is critical.  Entin and 
Serfaty (1999) further state that effective teams use implicit coordination strategies 
during high-stress situations and that “shared mental models are useful constructs to 
explain the anticipatory behavior of team members in the absence of scarcity of 




ability to adapt and respond to changing situations in highly complex, hazardous, and 
stressful situations (Salas et al., 2008; Wildman et al., 2012).  According to Espevik, 
Johnsen, and Eid (2011), shared mental models allow teams the flexibility to shift 
knowledge structures accurately in response to novel situations in high-intensity 
situations.  
The Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) research program 
members, commencing after the 1998 downing of an Iranian commercial aircraft by 
U.S.S. Vincennes, attempted to address team coordination and decision making under the 
high operational tempos, short decision times, and ambiguous information conditions   
(Espevik, Johnsen, Eid, & Thayer, 2006).  By comparing errors between expert and 
novice teams, TADMUS researchers found that high sharing mental model teams (a) are 
more accurate in predicting actions of teammates, (b) require less overt planning, (c) 
spend less time communicating, (d) make fewer requests for repeat information, (e) have 
better sequencing of activities, and (f) are more resilient to the effects of stress (Espevik 
et al., 2006).  The findings of the multi-year, multi-million dollar TADMUS research 
program led to advances in team training interventions such as mental model training 
(Beaubien, Baker, & Holtzman, 2003). 
Team Adaptability and Communication through Shared Mental Models  
In highly dynamic environments, shared mental models provide a common 
framework for teams to respond and adapt to situations requiring unfamiliar and 
unexpected performance (Marks et al., 2000).  Martin-Milham and Fiore (2005) believe a 
critical component of shared cognition is the team’s ability both “assess risk and the time 




environment” (p. 55-1).  Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall (2006) offer that team 
adaptability is not possible without shared mental models because “members do not have 
compatible views of equipment, tasks, and team member roles and responsibilities, which 
allow members to adapt proactively” (p. 1194). 
Flin et al. (2008) suggest that teams use the process of communication to develop 
shared mental models when operating in situations that require team decision-making.  In 
a low-fidelity tank simulation study of 79 three-member tank platoon teams formed by 
undergraduates of a large mid-Atlantic university, Marks et al. (2000) found that leader 
briefings influenced the development of team shared mental models which in turn 
positively affected team communication processes and team performance.  Salas, Rosen, 
et al. (2006) suggest that expert teams hold shared mental models allowing them to 
anticipate the needs of each other and coordinate their actions without overt 
communication. 
Shared Mental Models in Aircraft Cockpits  
Grote et al. (2010) believe cockpit crew effectiveness increases when using 
adaptive coordination based on actions or responses emerging from shared mental 
models.  Orasanu’s (1990) seminal research explores cockpit team communication and 
the role of shared mental models and planning.  Oransanu (1990) found that during 
increased workloads, cockpit crewmembers increase the amount of information while 
cockpit team leaders reduce the number of requests for information, thus suggesting a 
type of implicit coordination with the use of accurate shared mental models.  Burke et al. 
(2006) state that implicit coordination “requires that [team] members draw from their 




asked” (p. 1197).  Krieger (2005) believes that communication and interpersonal 
interaction are significant factors in human error in aviation and suggests that shared 
mindfulness among flight crew is necessary in improving team effectiveness.  Suggesting 
a communicative interaction that is conjointly-achieved, Krieger (2005) found that shared 
mindfulness allows cockpit team members to actively attend to, respond to, and perceive 
information and make decisions.          
 Flight crew coordination and performance in the cockpit are two central concepts 
in CRM, and the foundation for effective crew coordination and performance among 
flight crewmembers is shared mental models (FAA, 2003).  Researchers (Grote et al., 
2010; Krieger, 2005; Mathieu et al., 2000; Sperling & Pritchett, 2011) believe that shared 
mental models can enhance crew coordination in the multipiloted cockpits.  Endsley 
(2010) further recognizes the link between shared mental models in flight crew 
performance by suggesting that the CRM crew behaviors improve situation awareness 
indirectly through the development of shared mental models.  According to Robertson & 
Endsley (1995), flight crewmembers use a crew briefing and prior planning to establish 
shared mental models.  Those shared mental models allow flight crewmembers to predict 
how others will act, thus forming the basis for Level 3 situational awareness (projection 
of future status) and producing more efficient cockpit crews.  
Shared mental models in Coast Guard aviation  
The Coast Guard recently began introducing the concept of shared mental 
models in aircraft cockpits.  The author of Commandant Instruction M3710.1G, Air 
Operations Manual provides guidance on the use of standard phraseology and notes that 




or any other changes that affect the crew's shared mental model" (U.S. Coast Guard, 
2013, p. 4-2).  The Air Operations Manual further outlines standard phraseology for pilot 
flying and pilot monitoring during critical phases of flight, e.g. takeoffs, landings, to 
promote effective communication and reduce flight crew workload.  Coast Guard Office 
of Aviation Forces, Fixed Wing & Sensors Division Chief iterates the importance of 
shared mental models in Coast Guard cockpits: shared mental models shape how flight 
crews think and interact and represent an aspect of cockpit flight discipline.  If Coast 
Guard flight crews are not thinking the same thing when interacting in the cockpit, there 
is a problem (P. Beavis, personal communication, August 10, 2013).   
Monitoring and Backup Behaviors 
According to Salas, Rosen et al. (2006),  
shared cognition, in the form of compatible [shared] mental models, as well as 
mutual performance monitoring are necessary precursors to effective team 
processes, such as back-up behavior, because they form the foundation for 
decisions of when a team member must step in to provide backup, who should 
step in, and what assistance is needed. (p. 443)   
Burke et al. (2006) define mutual performance monitoring as a “cognitive action in which 
team members regularly observe the actions of their teammates and watch for mistakes, 
slips, lapses, errors, and performance discrepancies in an effort to catch and correct them 
in a timely manner” (p. 1195).  Marks et al. (2001) suggest that team members provide 
monitoring and backup behavior by (a) providing verbal feedback or coaching, (b) 
supporting in carrying out actions, or (c) assuming and completing a task for a team 




behaviors, but the ultimate goal is assisting the team member in getting his or her 
performance back on track (Dickinson & McIntyre, 1997).  According to Marks et al. 
(2002), mutual performance monitoring and backup are empirically derived team 
coordination skills which significantly contribute to team shared cognition and manifest 
through observable behaviors.  
Marks et al. (2002) state that backup behavior is an important teamwork process 
and define it as assisting team members in performing of tasks and recognize the 
criticality of backup behavior during challenging, highly interdependent, time-critical 
situations in which mistakes can jeopardize team success.  Porter, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, 
Ellis, and West (2003) have defined backup behaviors in the following way: 
The discretionary provision of resources and task-related effort to another 
member of one’s team that is intended to help that team member obtain the goals 
as defined by his or her role when it is apparent that the team member is failing to 
reach those goals. (p. 391)  
Porter et al. argue that effective backup behaviors require that team members to have an 
understanding of each other’s responsibilities and be both willing and able to provide and 
seek support when needed.  Furthermore, researchers (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2009) suggest 
that team members with more experience working together request and accept more 
backup from each other and that requesting and accepting backup increases with 
teammates’ familiarity.  Wilson et al. (2010) suggest that teams reduce the risk of errors 
and maintain performance with the following mechanisms:   
1. share knowledge of the team, task and environment;  




3. monitor each other’s performance to identify deficiencies and provide 
assistance; and  
4. maintain vigilance so as to adapt as the situation deems necessary. (p. 249)   
Salas et al. (2005) believe that monitoring and backup behaviors are closely associated 
with the shared mental models and suggest the following team research propositions:     
1. “Mutual performance monitoring affects team effectiveness through effective 
backup behavior” (p. 576). 
2. “Effective mutual performance monitoring will only occur in teams with 
adequate shared mental models and a climate of trust” (p. 577). 
3. “Effective backup behavior requires the existence of adequate shared mental 
models and mutual performance monitoring” (p. 580). 
Monitoring and Backup Behavior among Flight Crewmembers 
In multipiloted aircraft, mutual monitoring of the other pilot’s actions and tasks is 
essential for team coordination and effectiveness (Tullo, 2010).  Marks et al. (2001) 
believe that cockpit flight crewmembers use monitoring and backup behavior and render 
assistance when and if required to assist each other.  Marks et al. (2001) suggest that 
monitoring and backup behavior compensates for lapses in judgment or oversight made 
by the other flight crewmembers.  When flying, pilots monitor the aircraft’s course, 
configuration, and systems and in multipiloted aircraft cockpits, each other (Dismukes & 
Berman, 2010).  Potter, Blickensderfer, and Boquet (2014) believe that pilot monitoring 
is a cognitive strategy involving scanning and processing of both aircraft systems and the 





The concept of pilot monitoring is redefining the primary role differences 
between the pilot manipulating (or managing in the case of autopilot and flight director 
systems) the aircraft flight controls and the pilot not flying.  Citing accident reports by 
aviation safety organizations, Dismukes and Berman (2010) state that “lapses in 
monitoring have played a role in many aviation accidents” and suggest that since 
monitoring is often occurring concurrently with other tasks (e.g. communicating, tuning, 
setting), pilots mistakenly believe that monitoring is secondary to those other tasks.  
Aviation analyses show that most of the human errors detected in aviation are detected by 
crewmembers not making the errors and that pilot monitoring is “a valuable source in 
detecting mistakes of other team members” (Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009, p. 694).  
Pilots monitoring each other in multipiloted cockpits is essential to flight safety and serve 
as the final defense against cockpit threats and errors (Potter et al., 2014).   
The FAA (2003) revised Advisory Standard Operating Procedures for Flight 
Deck Crewmembers recognizing the primary role of the non-flying pilot, acknowledging 
that “it makes better sense to characterize pilots by what they are doing rather than by 
what they are not doing,” and further suggesting that pilot monitoring is now widely 
accepted as a more accurate term to describe that pilot not flying (p. 1).  The FAA (2003) 
identifies the division of duties and responsibilities of pilot flying and pilot monitoring 
and monitoring/cross-checking as flight deck discipline and states, “effective monitoring 
and cross-checking can be the last barrier or line of defense against accidents because 
detecting an error or unsafe situation may break the chain of events leading to an 




Commercial and military aviation organizations recognize the role of monitoring 
as a primary and shared responsibility of flight crewmembers and, following the FAA’s 
guidance, now label the pilot not actually flying the aircraft as pilot monitoring.  Tullo 
(2010) argues that pilots should practice and evaluate the skill of monitoring.  Tullo 
further argues that when pilot training occurs in multipiloted aircraft, the emphasis of the 
pilot not flying is monitoring.  Tullo believes doing so will reinforce the primary role of 
the pilot monitoring and de-emphasize individual performance, thus focusing it on the 
team performance.  
Monitoring and Backup Behavior and Cockpit Automation 
Cockpit automation is the execution of a task, function, or service by an 
automated system such as an autopilot, a flight director system, or a flight management 
system.  Cockpit automation can manage aircraft navigation, manipulate aircraft flight 
controls and engine power, and monitor aircraft systems (Dismukes et al., 2007; Mouloua 
et al., 2010).  Pilots use cockpit automation for more precise flying and aircraft systems 
monitoring than flying without automation (Reising, Liggett, & Munns, 1999 ; Wiener, 
1988).  Mouloua et al. (2010) point to growing empirical evidence on the negative effects 
of cockpit automation.  According to Mouloua et al., when aircraft are controlled by 
highly reliable cockpit automated systems such as autopilot, flight director system, and 
flight management system, a pilot’s ability to monitor the aircraft is affected.  
Researchers found that cockpit automation can lead to poor human-monitoring 
performance (Casner & Schooler, 2014; Comstock & Arnegard, 1992; Davies & 
Parasuraman, 1982; Dismukes & Berman, 2010).  Dismukes et al. (2007) suggest that 




human cognitive vulnerabilities.  Tesmer (2010) believes the biggest downside to cockpit 
automation is its inability to discern the flight crew intent.  Tesmer argues that cockpit 
automation tasks must verbalize, verify, and monitor between pilots in multipiloted 
cockpits to increase automation awareness.  
The crash of Air France Flight 447 in the Atlantic Ocean while en route from Rio 
de Janeiro to Paris represents a salient example of negative effects of advanced cockpit 
automation and the flight crew’s inability to monitor the aircraft and each other at the 
same time.  According to Langewiesche (2014), the pilot monitoring the pilot flying 
became so distracted with interpreting cockpit automation indications that he abandoned 
his primary role of monitoring the actions of the pilot flying.  Cockpit automation also 
caused both pilots to control the aircraft simultaneously without knowing the flight 
control inputs of the other pilot, further confusing predefined pilot flying and pilot 
monitoring roles and responsibilities.  Langewiesche (2014) believes cockpit automation 
led to basic communication and coordination difficulties at a time when the Air France 
cockpit flight crew needed them the most.  The interplay of cockpit automation and CRM 
was not fully understood until after the recovery of the aircraft flight data recorders and 
crash investigation.  Langewiesche (2014) believes that the Air France crash “stands out 
as the most perplexing and significant airline accident of modern times” (p. 258). 
Monitoring and Backup Behavior in Coast Guard Cockpits 
Following the commercial aviation industry, the Coast Guard aviation leaders 
recognize pilot monitoring and backup behaviors and are clarifying the focus of the pilot 
not operating the aircraft flight controls.  Recent air operations policy guidance now 




(U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  Fixed-wing aircraft communities in the Coast Guard (e.g. HC-
144, HC-130J) use the term pilot monitoring.  The HC-144A Aircraft Flight Manual 
specifically states that the “duties of the [pilot flying] and [pilot monitoring] shall be 
divided to provide the highest levels of situational awareness and…CRM” (U.S. Coast 
Guard, 2011b, p. 2A-4).  Coast Guard rotary-wing aircraft communities define the role of 
pilot monitoring and emphasize that the pilots monitoring should provide backup to the 
pilot flying (U.S. Coast Guard, 2009a; U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b).  For both fixed wing 
and rotary wing aircraft, the Coast Guard Air Operations Manual defines pilot 
monitoring communication protocol when using cockpit automation equipment (U.S. 
Coast Guard, 2013).  In Coast Guard multipiloted cockpits, the overall goal of the pilot 
not flying is to monitor the completion of all procedures and to provide back up to the 
other member of the flight crew (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  
Chapter Summary 
The Coast Guard continues to look for ways to operate aircraft safely and 
effectively but recent aircraft accidents require a fresh look at flight safety in Coast Guard 
aviation.  Concerns by aviation leadership about the use of and effectiveness of CRM 
among flight crews led to changes in delivery method and evaluation, but human error 
continues in Coast Guard cockpits.  However, human error in the cockpit is not new in 
aviation.  Commercial and military CRM training is a direct result of efforts to reduce 
human error in the cockpit and improve coordination and communication among cockpit 
crewmembers.  As new research in the psychosocial aspects of flight crew interaction 
continues to influence the focus of CRM, new CRM skills are emerging.  Teamwork 




crewmembers.  Similar to advanced aircraft systems with multiple redundancies for 
added protection for increase safety, multipiloted aircraft provide a human redundancy 
designed to provide mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors between 
pilots, increasing cockpit team effectiveness.  Coast Guard CRM must move toward 
leveraging multipiloted human redundancy behaviors and training team skills that both 








Commercial and military aviation CRM attempts to increase flight crew 
effectiveness by improving cockpit teamwork processes.  Recent Coast Guard aircraft 
mishaps costing lives and millions of dollars indicate a need for a better understanding of 
shared mental models and their role in cockpit flight crew team coordination CRM skills.  
The purpose of the study was to examine the effect of the ITO maneuver shared mental 
model among Coast Guard aircraft cockpit flight crews, ITO type (coupled or manual), 
and cockpit flight crew total flight time on ITO maneuver mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors.  In this chapter, the researcher describes the study’s 
population and sample, research design including study variables, researcher-designed 
instruments used in the study, internal and external validity threats, Institutional Review 
Board approval procedures, and data collection procedures.   
Research Objectives (RO) 
 The research objectives of the study are as follows:   
RO1:  Describe the demographics of the study population according to pilot 
designation/qualification and cockpit flight crew total flight time experience.  
RO2:  Determine the level of mental model sharedness in MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight 
crews of ITO maneuver critical team tasks. 
RO3:  Determine the relationship between the ITO maneuver shared mental model score 
and observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in 




RO4:  Compare the type of instrument takeoff (coupled or manual) on observed levels of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft cockpit 
flight crews. 
RO5:  Determine the relationship between flight crew total flight time and observed 
levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft 
cockpit flight crews. 
RO6:  Determine the combined interaction effect of the ITO maneuver shared mental 
model score, ITO type, and flight crew total flight time on observed levels of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in MH-65 aircraft cockpit 
flight crews. 
Population and Sample 
 The population of the study was Coast Guard pilots who fly the MH-65 aircraft.  
Approximately 430 pilots fly the MH-65 at 19 Coast Guard Air Stations across the 
country (K. Barres, personal communication October 15, 2013).  The MH-65 pilots have 
completed initial military flight training and are currently trained to fly the MH-65 
aircraft.  The pilots are assigned specific designations based on training and aviation 
experience as one of the following (ranked from lowest to highest):  1) copilot, 2) first 
pilot, and 3) aircraft commander.  According to U.S. Coast Guard (2013), each pilot 
designation represents specific roles and responsibilities within the aircraft cockpit and 
certifies the pilot has gained a specific level of training and experience to safely fly the 
aircraft in day and night during all weather conditions.   
The copilot designation is for pilots initially trained in the MH-65 aircraft who 




communications and security procedures, Federal Aviation Regulations, and FAA 
policies and procedures.  The copilot designation is for pilots holding a military pilot 
rating (military aviator) but lack Coast Guard mission and operational experience (U.S. 
Coast Guard, 2013).  The first pilot and aircraft commander designations are for pilots 
who possess higher levels of aircraft experience and Coast Guard operational experience 
and can function as pilot in command.  Pilots functioning as pilot in command are 
ultimately responsible for the safe, orderly, efficient, and effective performance of the 
flight and mission completion (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  Though both first pilot and 
aircraft commander designations can function as pilot in command, the aircraft 
commander designation is for pilots who have demonstrated higher levels of aviation 
judgment, flight discipline, aircrew supervision, and the use of cockpit CRM principles.     
In addition to the three pilot designations, some pilots are also qualified as 
instructor pilots, allowing them to perform formal instruction, evaluation, and 
standardization (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  The instructor pilot qualification is in addition 
to the aircraft commander designation and normally given to pilots who are highly 
competent aircraft commanders.  All instructor pilots are aircraft commanders, but not all 
aircraft commanders are instructor pilots.  Coast Guard instructor pilots must demonstrate 
personal characteristics such as superior judgment, patience, discretion, a desire to 
instruct, and the ability to inspire confidence and win respect (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  
Coast Guard instructor pilots are individually-selected and represent the highest level of 
aviation experience and maturity among pilots.  Instructor pilots are responsible for the 
training and evaluation of all MH-65 pilots and the mentoring of less experienced pilots 





According to Fink (2003), a convenience sample consists of individuals who are 
willing to participate and easily available for sampling.  Pilots attending their MH-65 
Proficiency Simulator Course at ATC Mobile were invited to participate in the study.  
The MH-65 Proficiency Simulator Course is a weeklong training course required by all 
MH-65 pilots on a 15-month recurrent cycle.  The course provides a mechanism for 
FAA-required pilot instrument checks and flight scenarios emphasizing aircraft 
emergency procedures and critical flight maneuvers (Federal Aviation 
Regulations/Aeronautical Information Manual, 2013; U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  The 
MH-65 Proficiency Simulator Course consists of both ground school and Operational 
Flight Trainer (OFT) events.  As seen in Table 4, there are four separate OFT events in a 
week-long Proficiency Simulator Course (ranked in event order): 1) Emergency 
Procedures 1, 2) Instrument Check 1, 3) Instrument Check 2, and 4) Emergency 
Procedures 2.  Instrument check OFT events assess pilot instrument flight planning 
knowledge and abilities and in-flight instrument procedures.  The emergency procedures 
OFT events evaluate aircraft systems and emergency procedural knowledge.  
Table 4 
MH-65 Proficiency Simulator Course OFT Events 










Pilots attending the Proficiency Simulator Course are divided into two-pilot cockpit flight 




promotes crew familiarity and allows the assessment of CRM skills between the two 
pilots during the course.  The study used the cockpit flight crews established by the MH-
65 Proficiency Simulator Course schedulers.    
Research Design 
A cross-sectional, descriptive, nonexperimental repeated measures design was 
used in this study (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  Data was collected during an 
eleven-week period from June to August 2014 corresponding with MH-65 Proficiency 
Simulator Course convenings.  The availability of MH-65 instructor pilots at ATC 
Mobile during summer transfer season and the maintenance upgrade of the MH-65 OFT 
limited the data collection period to approximately three months.  Thirty-three cockpit 
flight crews participated, and all cockpit flight crews asked agreed to participate.  Thirty-
three cockpit flight crews participating closely matches the number of teams utilized in 
past shared mental model research (Marks et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2002; Mathieu et al., 
2005; Mathieu et al., 2005).       
 Instrument Takeoffs (ITOs) 
 The study consisted of cockpit flight crews flying ITOs (two per pilot) in the MH-
65 OFT.  Pilots fly ITOs using cockpit flight instruments when visibility is poor and 
insufficient references exist for visual takeoffs (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b).  According to 
the MH-65 Aircraft Flight Manual (U.S. Coast Guard, 2010b), two types of ITOs, 
coupled and manual, are available for use by MH-65 cockpit flight crews during low 
visibility conditions.  A coupled ITO transitions the aircraft from hovering to a climb 
using the flight director automated system.  During a manual ITO, the pilot “manually” 




cockpit automation to fly the aircraft.  Both types of ITOs are acceptable methods for 
safely climbing the helicopter away from the water in low visibility conditions following 
overwater hover operations.    
In May of 2012, a Coast Guard Transition Flight Working Group convened to 
review rotary wing procedures associated with critical phases of low overwater helicopter 
operations (D. Waters, personal communication, April 19, 2013).  Several 
recommendations made by the Coast Guard Transition Flight Working Group were 
implemented to enhance safety and increase operational effectiveness of their helicopter 
flight crews.  Interim Change 5 of the MH-65 Aircraft Flight Manual, released in April of 
2013, modified the procedures for coupled and manual ITOs, thereby enhancing safety 
during low overwater helicopter operations.  Safely flying the helicopter in low visibility 
conditions following overwater hover operations remained the primary purpose of 
coupled and manual ITOs, and the description of the maneuvers remained relatively 
unchanged.  However, Interim Change 5 standardized coupled and manual ITO briefing 
items, delineated more specifically pilot flying duties and safety pilot duties, and 
standardized cockpit flight crew verbal communication during the ITO maneuvers (see 
Figure 3).  The modified procedures were designed to increase cockpit flight crew 
coordination by establishing specific guidelines on monitoring and backup behaviors of 
the safety pilot during the ITO maneuvers.  The coupled and manual ITO were chosen by 
the researcher because of the critical nature of low overwater helicopter operations and 
the importance of proper mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors by the 






   
 
Figure 3. MH-65 Aircraft Coupled and Manual Instrument Takeoff (ITO) Procedures 
Coupled and Manual Instrument Takeoff Procedures describing the maneuvers and 
specific Pilot at the Controls and Safety Pilot cockpit tasks.  Adapted from “Flight 
Manual USCG Series HH-65C Helicopter, CGTO 1H-65C-1 (Interim Change 5).” 
Washington, DC:  Author. pp. 2-19, 20.  Copyright 2010 by the U.S. Coast Guard.  
Adapted with permission. 
 
Research Design 
In this repeated measures design study, cockpit flight crews flew four ITO 
maneuvers (two coupled and two manual) in their Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event of 
the MH-65 Proficiency Simulator Course.  According to Sprinthall (2012), a repeated 
measures design allows the study subjects to be measured more than once, therefore 
creating a within-subjects design.  To determine the mutual performance monitoring and 




visibility conditions, each pilot flew a coupled ITO and a manual ITO and then 
functioned as safety pilot while the other pilot flew a coupled ITO and a manual ITO.  
Pilots monitor aircraft systems and each other when operating the aircraft (Dismukes & 
Berman, 2010; Marks et al., 2001; Potter et al., 2014; Tullo, 2010).  A repeated measures 
design was used to allow both pilots to be measured on monitoring and backing up as the 
pilot flying and pilot monitoring during the ITOs.  
Research Variables 
 There were three independent variables and one dependent variable used in the 
study.  The three independent variables were the ITO maneuver shared mental model 
score, type of ITO being flown, and cockpit flight crew total flight time.  The dependent 
variable was the ITO maneuver monitoring/backup behavior score.  The following is a 
discussion of each variable and its purpose in the study.    
ITO Maneuver Shared Mental Model Score 
According to Stout et al. (1999), a shared mental model is a coordinating 
mechanism for effective teamwork.  Shared mental models can enhance crew 
coordination and situational awareness in multipiloted cockpits (Endsley, 2010; Grote et 
al., 2010; Krieger, 2005; Mathieu et al., 2000; Sperling & Pritchett, 2011).  Marks et al. 
(2000) classified the sharedness levels of mental models in cockpit flight crews as a 
similarity index score.  Mathieu et al. (2005) and Mathieu et al. (2000) classified the 
sharedness levels of mental models in cockpit flight crews as a centrality index score.  
The sharedness score of Marks et al. (2000), Mathieu et al. (2005), and Mathieu et al. 
(2000) indicated the influence of the shared mental model on cockpit flight crew 




 Using the methodology found in Marks et al. (2000), Mathieu et al. (2005), and 
Matheiu et al. (2000), the researcher determined a shared mental model score for each 
cockpit flight crew indicating the level of mental model sharedness of the ITO 
maneuvers.  To determine the effect of flight crew shared mental model on mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behaviors, the study used the cockpit flight crew 
shared mental model score as an interval variable.   
ITO Type (coupled or manual)  
A coupled ITO transitions the aircraft to a climbout profile using a cockpit 
automated system while the manual ITO involves the pilot “manually” hand-flying the 
ITO flight climbout profile.  Though both types of ITOs are designed to establish a 
climbout profile when transitioning to forward flight following overwater hover 
operations, the coupled ITO relies primarily on aircraft cockpit automation to fly the 
maneuver.  According to Dismukes & Berman (2010), flight crews monitor aircraft flight 
instruments less when aircraft are controlled by highly reliable cockpit automated 
systems when the probability for error is lower.  However, it is unclear whether pilot 
monitoring and backup of cockpit automation is similar to pilot monitoring and backup of 
the other pilot in multipiloted cockpits.  To determine the effect of cockpit automation on 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors between MH-65 cockpit flight 
crews, the study used ITO type (coupled or manual) as a nominal (categorical) variable.  
Cockpit Flight Crew Total Flight Time  
Flin et al. (2008) believe that level of experience, technical expertise, and 
familiarity with situations influence decision-making.  According to Prince, Salas, 




based on the experience level of the individual pilots.  A pilot’s aviation judgment and 
decision making increase with flying experience and maturity.  The Coast Guard 
recognizes that more experienced pilots, e.g. instructor pilots and aircraft commanders, 
should possess higher degrees of judgment, flight discipline, and CRM skills (U.S. Coast 
Guard, 2013).   
In aviation, one indicator of experience and maturity is pilot total hours.  In both 
commercial and military aviation, total pilot time is an industry-standard indication for 
flight experience, aviation discipline, maturity, and decision-making.  Total pilot time is 
used as a discriminator in pilot hiring decisions.  However, total pilot time as an 
experience indicator varies among aviation industry sectors, e.g. general aviation or 
airline transport aviation.  Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) classify a general aviation 
novice pilot as having accumulated less than 1,000 flight hours and an expert pilot as 
having more than 1,000 flight hours.  Studying the role of flight hours and cockpit flight 
crew performance, Todd and Thomas (2012) classify airline transport first officers with 
less than 1,500 flight hours as low time pilots and first officers with more than 1,500 
flight hours as high time pilots.  Airline captains with less than 5,000 flight hours are 
considered low flight time captains, and captains with more than 5,000 are high time 
captains (Todd & Thomas, 2012).   
Coast Guard pilots are normally initially designated in aircraft type with as little 
as 200 total flight hours.  The designations of first pilot and aircraft commander require a 
minimum of 500 and 700 total flight hours, respectively (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  The 
Coast Guard Air Operations Manual encourages Coast Guard pilots to accumulate 20-25 




(U.S. Coast Guard, 2013).  Coast Guard first pilots and aircraft commanders are required 
to fly a minimum of 96 flight hours a year (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013) but normally can 
acquire 200 to 400 flight hours a year.  According to Prince et al. (2010), cockpit flight 
crews communicate differently based on each pilot’s experience and maturity.  However, 
it is unclear whether cockpit flight crew aviation experience and maturity level, 
quantified in total flight time, affects cockpit flight crew mutual performance monitoring 
and backup behaviors.  To gauge the overall experience and maturity level of the 
participating cockpit flight crews, the researcher combined the total flight hours of each 
cockpit flight crew (two pilots) to create a cockpit total flight time interval variable. 
Mutual Performance Monitoring and Backup Behavior Score 
Research shows that monitoring is the act of observing behaviors and actions of 
other team members, thus allowing team members to identify mistakes and lapses in 
behaviors and actions (Salas et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2007).  Backup behaviors occur 
when team members help each other perform their roles, and research indicates the 
positive effect between backup behaviors and team performance (Porter et al., 2003).    
Derived from the team performance process analysis found in earlier shared mental 
model research (Mathieu et al., 2005; Mathieu et al., 2005; Marks et al., 2002; Marks et 
al., 2002), the levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors of each 
cockpit flight crew ITO maneuvers were judged to create a mutual performance 








 Two researcher-designed data collection instruments were used in the study: 1) 
Shared Mental Model Instrument, and 2) Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument.  The 
purpose of the Shared Mental Model Instrument was to determine the level of sharedness 
of cockpit flight crews’ mental model regarding the coupled and manual ITO maneuvers 
and to create a shared mental model score for each cockpit flight crew for later 
comparison with ITO maneuver mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.  
The purpose of the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument was to determine the level of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors occurring between each cockpit 
flight crew during the coupled and manual ITOs and to create a coupled and manual ITO 
score.  
Shared Mental Model Instrument Development Background 
 The researcher-designed Shared Mental Model Instrument was derived from 
earlier shared mental model instruments found in Marks et al. (2002), Mathieu et al. 
(2005) and Mathieu et al. (2000) which identified critical team tasks across flight crew 
team positions necessary for mission success.  Mathieu et al. (2005) and Mathieu et al. 
(2000) identified critical team tasks of a two-person team flight crew flying an F-16 flight 
simulator on a military mission (see Table 5).  Marks et al. (2002) identified critical team 
tasks of a three-person flight crew (pilot, gunner, and radar specialist) operating an 
Apache attack helicopter flight simulator in battlefield attack missions (see Table 5).  In 
Mathieu et al. (2005) and Matheieu et al. (2000) as well as Marks et al. (2002), the 




predict and describe who should do what at a particular point in time during the flight 
missions to complete the assigned mission.  
Table 5 
Critical Team Tasks Identified to Complete the Mission 
 
Mathieu et al. (2005) 
Mathieu et al. (2000) 
Marks et al. 
(2002) 
Diving/climbing Escape enemy attacks 
Banking/turning Follow waypoints 
Choosing airspeed Identify enemy 
Selecting and shooting weapons Position helicopter for targeting 
Reading/interpreting radar Adjust speed  
Intercepting the enemy Fire weapons  
Escaping the enemy Announce enemy approach 
Dispensing chaff and flares Adjust altitude 
 Select target 
 
 After identifying the critical team tasks to successfully complete the mission, 
Mathieu et al. (2005), Matheiu et al. (2000), and Marks et al. (2002) asked each member 
of the flight crew to judge the relatedness of each team task to other identified team tasks 
and assign a number ranging from 1 (not related) to 9 (very related).  The team member 
scores were fed into computer programs and compared to other team member scores to 
determine a similarity index (Marks et al., 2000) or centrality index (Mathieu et al., 2005; 
Mathieu et al., 2000) indicating a level of team mental model sharedness regarding 
critical team tasks.  
Shared Mental Model Instrument  
The researcher conducted a team task analysis, based on a methodology described 




instructor pilot.  The analysis resulted in seven critical team tasks for ITO maneuvers 
common to both the coupled and manual ITOs (see Table 6).  The seven ITO maneuver 
critical team tasks were placed both vertically and horizontally in the Shared Mental 
Model Instrument, producing a grid-like format with empty boxes creating an intersection 
between two ITO maneuver team tasks (see Appendix B).  The grid-like format allowed 
the recording of a related value between two ITO maneuver team tasks by each pilot of a 
cockpit flight crew. 
Table 6 
Critical Team Tasks Identified to Complete an ITO Maneuver  
 
Coupled ITO Manual ITO 
Aligning maneuver expectations 
(Departure Brief) 
Aligning maneuver expectations 
(Departure Brief) 
Establishing pre-ITO aircraft configuration Establishing pre-ITO aircraft configuration 
Pilot at the controls & safety pilot verbal 
call outs 
Pilot at the controls & safety pilot verbal 
call outs 
Monitoring attitude, airspeed, & altitude Monitoring attitude, airspeed, & altitude 
Monitoring flight director for proper 
control inputs 
Monitoring flight director for proper 
control inputs 
Achieving desired level-off altitude Achieving desired level-off altitude 
Conducting level-off checklist Conducting level-off checklist 
 
Each pilot of the cockpit flight crew completed the Shared Mental Model 
Instrument by judging the relatedness of each critical team task to another task and 
choosing a value ranging from 1 (not related) to 5 (very related).  The pilot recorded the 
value of the two critical team tasks in each box intersecting of two critical team tasks (see 




The researcher compared the critical team task values recorded on each pilot’s 
Shared Mental Model Instrument and created a shared mental model score for each 
critical team task comparison.  For example, if one pilot chose a value of 1, indicating a 
low related value between two critical team tasks, and the other pilot chose 5, indicating a 
high related value between two critical team tasks, the shared mental model score for this 
two tasks comparison equaled 4.  The critical team tasks shared mental model scores 
were aggregated to produce a total shared mental score for each MH-65 cockpit flight 
crew.  A low shared mental score represented a high level of mental model sharedness for 
the cockpit flight crew.  The Shared Mental Model Instrument also captured study 
participant pilot designation and total flight time descriptive statistics.   
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument Background 
 For cockpit flight crews, observable behaviors are specific actions employing 
CRM skills in a given situation (FAA, 2006).  The researcher-designed 
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument was derived from past CRM behavioral marker 
instruments designed to capture and measure cockpit flight crew observable behaviors.  
According to Flin and Martin (2001), behavioral markers have been used to represent a 
prescribed set of behaviors leading to a performance aspect.   
The Targeted Acceptable Responses to Generated Events or Tasks methodology 
was used to evaluate team CRM performance by identifying events that elicit behaviors 
of interest and then controlling the introduction of those events through an OFT in-flight 
scenario script (Fowlkes, Lane, Salas, Franz, & Oser, 1994).  The goal of Targeted 
Acceptable Responses to Generated Events or Tasks is minimizing observer judgments of 




Hormann, Flin, Lodge, Goeters, & JARTEL Group, 2002).  Non-Technical Skills is a 
behavioral rating system to assess a pilot’s CRM non-technical skills.  The framework of 
Non-Technical Skills is intended to reduce ambiguities in evaluating pilot CRM skills 
(Flin, 2010).  The basic usability and psychometric properties of Non-Technical Skills 
was tested within a consortium of European research centers and aviation companies.  
The test consisted of eight recorded OFT airline transport operational scenarios, each 
with a unique set of design references, reflecting pilot non-technical skills for behavior 
categories (O’Conner et al., 2002).  Instructors rated cockpit flight crew behaviors in each 
scenario and judged predefined behaviors on a 5-point scale score form ranging from 
very poor to very good (Flin, 2010).         
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument 
In order to determine the level of mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors during the coupled and manual ITOs flown by the cockpit flight crews, the 
researcher-designed Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument established scenario-based 
predefined CRM behavior markers similar to Targeted Acceptable Responses to 
Generated Events or Tasks and Non-Technical Skills.  The behavior markers were 
derived from mutual performance monitoring and backup statements and questions found 
in Salas et al. (2005) and Wilson et al. (2007; see Table 7) .  The teamwork behavior 
markers of Salas et al. (2005) and Wilson et al. (2007) were contextualized to the roles 
and responsibilities of cockpit flight crews (pilot flying and pilot monitoring) during the 
coupled and manual ITO maneuvers and captured as five mutual performance monitoring 
and five backup behavior CRM behavior markers in the Monitoring/Backup Behavior 




backup behavior marker is scaled from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very great extent) in order 
to rate the level of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors of each cockpit 
flight crew.  The Likert rating scale used in the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument 
is similar to the rating scale found in Mathieu et al. (2005) and Mathieu et al. (2000).   
Table 7 
Teamwork Behavior Markers 
 
Salas et al.  
(2005) 
Wilson et al. 
(2007) 
Mutual Performance Monitoring Mutual Performance Monitoring 
Identifying mistakes and lapses in other 
team members’ actions. 
Did team members observe the 
behaviors and actions of other team 
members?  
Providing feedback regarding team 
member actions to facilitate self-
correction. 
Did team members recognize mistakes 
made recognize mistakes made by 
others? 
 Were team members aware of their own 
and others’ surroundings? 
Backup Behavior Backup Behavior 
Recognition by potential backup 
providers that there is a workload 
distribution problem in the their team.  
Did team members correct other team 
members errors?  
 
Shifting of work responsibilities to 
underutilized team members. 
Did team members provide and request 
assistance when needed? 
Completion of the whole task or parts of 
tasks by other team members.  
Did team members recognize when one 
performed exceptionally well?  
 
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Observation Methodology 
To determine the mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors displayed 
by the cockpit flight crews during the coupled and manual ITOs, two CRM SMEs viewed 
the recorded ITO maneuvers on the Computer-Aided Debriefing Station and completed a 




The two CRM SMEs are highly experienced Coast Guard instructor pilots with over 
15,000 combined flight hours and experts in multipiloted cockpit coordination and CRM 
principles.  The debriefing station used by the CRM SMEs is located in the pilots’ 
debriefing room at ATC Mobile and allows for over-the-shoulder video/audio recording 
of the cockpit area and instrument panel and training event playback capability (see 
Figure 4).  The debriefing room is normally used for recording MH-65 Proficiency 
Simulator Course OFT events.  The CRM SMEs observing the recorded coupled and 
manual ITOs knew the purpose and research objectives of the study but were unaware of 
the shared mental model scoring of each cockpit flight crew while judging the mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behavior levels. 
 
Figure 4. Computer-Aided Debriefing Station Screen.   
Instrumentation by Research Objective and Study Variables 
The two researcher-designed data collection instruments explored the six research 




Shared Mental Model Instrument was used for describing the demographics of the study 
population according to pilot designation/qualification and obtaining the cockpit flight 
crew total flight time experience (RO1).  The Shared Mental Model Instrument also 
determined the level of mental model sharedness of MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews 
on ITO maneuver critical team tasks (RO2).   
The Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument captured the MH-65 cockpit flight 
crews’ observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during 
the coupled and manual ITOs and determined the relationship of those behaviors and ITO 
maneuver shared mental model score (RO3), type of instrument takeoff (coupled or 
manual (RO4), and flight crew total flight time (RO5).  The data collection instruments 
and their associated research objectives, independent variables, dependent variable, and 
statistical analysis are seen in Figure 5.     
Research 
Objective 
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Instrument Validity and Reliability  
 According to Phillips and Phillips (2007), validity is the degree to which an 
instrument measures what it is designed to measure, and reliability is the consistency of 
the instrument over time.  According to Hall and Brannick (2008), a major drawback 
when using humans as judges is that judges may disagree with each other and interpret 
differently what they observe.  A validity threat to the study was interrater reliability 
between the CRM SMEs judging mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors 
when completing the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments on the recorded cockpit 
flight crew ITO maneuvers.  To increase the study’s construct validity, the CRM SME 
raters received a one-hour training session on the use of the Monitoring/Backup Behavior 
Instrument.  The training included a review of mutual performance monitoring and 
backup statements and questions found in Salas et al. (2005) and Wilson et al. (2007) as 
well as a review of the five mutual performance monitoring and five backup behavior 
CRM behavior markers on the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument.   
Interrater reliability was tested between CRM SMEs judging mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors.  The Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument scores 
were tested using Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient (r) to assess interrater 
reliability between the two CRM SMEs judging the mutual performance monitoring and 
backup behaviors.  Pearson’s r is possible for interrater reliability when raters produce 
raw scores (Huck, 2012) and is a popular statistic test for calculating the degree of 
consistency among independent raters (Multon, 2010).  Pearson’s r of .70 is an acceptable 
level of reliability (Multon, 2010).  Pearson’s r tests between the two CRM SMEs were 




respectively.  A low Pearson’s r interrater reliability score between the two CRM SMEs 
for coupled and manual scores possibly occurred as a result of the Monitoring/Backup 
Behavior Instrument mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors scoring. 
 Additional threats to the CRM SME observations and the Monitoring/Backup 
Behavior Instrument included observer errors of leniency and central tendency (Pershing 
Warren, & Rowe, 2006).  Errors of leniency occur when observers rate behaviors high 
regardless of performance, and errors of central tendency occur when observers rate all 
participants at the middle of the scale (Pershing et al., 2006).  Defining flight crew 
monitoring and backup observable behaviors and Likert scale levels during the CRM 
SME training helped to decrease possible errors of leniency and central tendency.  During 
the CRM SME training, the researcher reviewed examples of low, medium, and high 
levels of pilot monitoring behaviors and backup behaviors. 
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument Validity Threat 
The 10 ITO maneuver mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior 
markers found on the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument seen in Appendix D are 
based on the teamwork behavior markers found in Salas et al. (2005) and Wilson et al. 
(2007).  According to Phillips (1997), behavior markers are used for observing the 
presence or absence and frequency of behaviors of study participants.  The behaviors in 
this study were the mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors of the cockpit 
flight crews during the coupled and manual ITOs.  However, eight of the 10 ITO 
maneuver mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior markers on the 
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument require either cockpit flight crew flight control 




make a mistake, lapse, or error, the mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior 
became unmeasurable.  For example, Behavior Marker 6 on the Monitoring/Backup 
Behavior Instrument could not be judged by CRM SME observers if a flight control error 
was not made by the pilot flying.  In these instances, the CRM SMEs observing the 
recorded cockpit flight crew ITO maneuvers noted the behavior marker as “not 
applicable.”  “Not applicable” behavior markers were removed from the total possible 
score in an attempt to reduce observation instrument inaccuracy and maintain 
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument validity.  Therefore, each completed 
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument final score was calculated only on the behavior 
markers scored and not the 200 total possible points on the Monitoring/Backup Behavior 
Instrument. 
Threats to Internal and External Validity  
The researcher considered threats to internal and external validity (Shadish et al., 
2002).  The convenience sampling of 66 MH-65 pilots forming 33 MH-65 cockpit flight 
crews presented an internal validity threat to the study.  Since a random sampling of all 
Coast Guard MH-65 pilots located across the United States and Puerto Rico was cost 
prohibitive, the convenience sample of 66 MH-65 pilots (33 MH-65 cockpit flight crews) 
attending their annual MH-65 Proficiency Simulator Course was deemed acceptable to 
the researcher.  To moderate the convenience sampling validity threat of the study, the 
researcher reviewed the designation and experience level pairing of each cockpit flight 
crew to ensure the pairing closely matched that normally occurring in MH-65 aircraft 
cockpits at Coast Guard Air Stations.  Cockpit flight crew designation pairings and 




The recent changes to the MH-65 Aircraft Flight Manual regarding coupled and 
manual ITO maneuvers represented a history threat to the study.  Since all MH-65 
cockpit flight crews had been trained and evaluated on the new ITO maneuver 
procedures, there was a reasonable expectation that flight crews were familiar and 
proficient in the ITO modified procedures.  To increase internal validity, all participating 
flight crews were advised of the upcoming ITO maneuvers when signing their informed 
consent forms allowing them to review the ITO maneuver procedures prior to their 
Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event. 
To reduce the testing effect of the ITO maneuver repeated measures data 
collection, the researcher used a Latin Square design to counterbalance the four recorded 
ITO maneuvers in the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event.  The repeated measures 
allowed both pilots to be measured in pilot flying and pilot monitoring roles.  The Latin 
Square design determined ITO type, order of ITOs, and flight crew duties by seat position 
for each cockpit flight crew (see Appendix E).  To ensure the four ITO maneuvers were 
conducted similarly for each cockpit flight crew, each ATC Mobile instructor pilot 
conducting the ITO maneuvers was given a job aid outlining the Latin Square design to 
be used for their particular Emergency Procedures  2 OFT event.   
External validity refers to the ability to apply the study to other settings and 
populations (Sprinthall, 2012).  The study’s setting was in the Coast Guard’s MH-65D 
OFT.  According to Moroney and Moroney (2010), OFTs are a valid representation of 
aircraft flight and system characteristics.  Commercial and military aviation use OFTs 
extensively for flight crew training and to create dynamic real-world situations to 




According to the Civil Aviation Authority (2006), OFTs allow crews to practice CRM 
behaviors under normal and emergency conditions.  Fowlkes et al. (1994) used OFT in-
flight scenarios to evaluate team CRM performance.  Dismukes (2009) argues that full-
mission flight simulation (OFTs) allow for ethnographic observation and laboratory 
experimentation when studying the expert performance of real world tasks.  Given past 
CRM research using OFTs (Fowlkes et al., 1994; O’Conner et al., 2002; Potter et al., 
2014), the researcher believes that this study’s findings on cockpit flight crew mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behaviors may be applicable to monitoring and 
backup behaviors found in other Coast Guard and United States military multipiloted 
cockpits. 
Institutional Review Board Approval 
The researcher submitted the data collection instruments (Shared Mental Model 
Instrument and Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument), data collection plan, and study 
participant consent form to The University of Southern Mississippi Institution Review 
Board (IRB) for human subject review and approval (The University of Southern 
Mississippi Institutional Review Board website, n.d).  Following research approval by 
The University of Southern Mississippi (see Appendix F), similar human subjects 
research forms were submitted to the U.S. Coast Guard IRB for human subject review 
and approval (U.S. Coast Guard, 2011a).  U.S. Coast Guard IRB approval was granted 
approximately one month later (Appendix G).  Both IRB reviews were necessary to 
ensure the proposed research met the relevant federal and institutional standards and the 
ethical treatment and well-being of those participating in the study.  The Coast Guard’s 




Data Collection Procedures 
Data collection began immediately following The University of Southern 
Mississippi and U.S. Coast Guard IRB approval.  The MH-65 Proficiency Simulator 
Course convened each Monday and finished by Thursday or Friday of the same week.  
On the first day of the course, the researcher reviewed the designation/experience level 
pairing of each cockpit flight crew to ensure a minimum of one instructor pilot or aircraft 
commander was part of each cockpit flight crew ensuring normal cockpit flight crew 
representation.  The number of cockpit flight crews available for the study varied from 
one to four cockpit flight crews per week. 
The researcher met with each Proficiency Simulator Course cockpit flight crew 
member during the Emergency Procedures 1 OFT event, explaining the research study’s 
objectives and distributing an IRB Informed Consent Form (Appendix H) to each pilot of 
the cockpit flight crew.  After each pilot signed the research study’s consent form and the 
researcher answered all questions about the study, each pilot received a Shared Mental 
Model Instrument.  The researcher explained what the Shared Mental Model Instrument’s 
purpose was and how to individually complete grid-like format by judging the relatedness 
of each critical team task to another task and choosing a related value ranging from 1 (not 
related) to 5 (very related).  Each pilot acknowledged fully understanding how to 
complete the Shared Mental Model Instrument.  The researcher informed the cockpit 
flight crewmembers to bring their completed Shared Mental Model Instruments to their 
Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event later in the week.  The cockpit flight crews were also 
advised about the ITO maneuvers later that week during the Emergency Procedures 2 




ITOs were being specifically observed for mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors.   
The Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event always occurred Thursday or Friday 
during the week of the Proficiency Simulator Course.  The researcher met with each 
cockpit flight crew at the start of the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event and collected a 
completed Shared Mental Model Instrument from each pilot.  Prior to boarding the MH-
65 OFT, the ATC Mobile instructor pilot conducting the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT 
event was given a job aid outlining the Latin Square design order for that particular 
cockpit flight crew.  Additional information on the job aid included protocol for labeling 
the coupled and manual ITOs recordings by cockpit flight crew number for later viewing.  
Since the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event contained other training maneuvers and 
instructional items, the ATC Mobile instructor pilot was given latitude on when to 
complete the coupled and manual ITOs during the OFT event.  The researcher was not in 
the OFT during the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event.   
Within a week of the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event, each CRM SME 
individually viewed the recorded ITO maneuvers on the debriefing station and completed 
a Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument for the two coupled and two manual ITOs 
performed by each cockpit flight crew.  Though the four ITOs took approximately 20 
minutes to complete during the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event, completing of 
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments while watching the four recorded ITOs took 
approximately 1 to 1.5 hours for each cockpit flight crew.  The playback capability of the 
debriefing station allowed the CRM SMEs to observe each cockpit flight crew interaction 
during the ITO maneuvers as many times as necessary to observe and judge all mutual 
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Model Instruments and four Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments) were available 
for only 30 participating cockpit flight crews.  In the following section, the researcher 
describes the data collection preparation steps for the researcher-designed instruments in 
preparation for data analysis. 
Shared Mental Model Instrument Data 
 Participating MH-65 pilots completed a Shared Mental Model Instrument and 
gave it to the researcher prior to their involvement in the cockpit flight crew ITO 
maneuvers.  The researcher calculated the shared mental model score for each cockpit 
flight crew.  The data set for analysis contained 30 cockpit flight crew shared mental 
model scores. The Shared Mental Model Instruments also produced a pilot designation 
pairing, e.g. aircraft commander / first pilot, and cockpit total flight time descriptive 
statistics for each cockpit flight crew. 
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument Data 
Each cockpit flight crew flew four ITO maneuvers (two coupled and two manual) 
during the Emergency Procedures 2 OFT event.  Each pilot flew a coupled ITO and 
manual ITO and then functioned as safety pilot while the other pilot flew a coupled and 
manual ITO.  The cockpit flight crew total data collection package consisted of four 
coupled ITO Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments (two per CRM SME observer) 
and four manual ITO Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments (two per CRM SME 
observer).  The maximum number of points for each Monitoring/Backup Behavior 
Instrument was 50 with total possible points of 200 for each cockpit flight crew’s four 






 The study’s six research objectives were measured using a cross-sectional, 
descriptive, nonexperimental repeated measures methodology with MH-65 pilots 
attending their annual Proficiency Simulator Course.  Using the MH-65 OFT located at 
ATC Mobile, cockpit flight crews flew coupled and manual ITO maneuvers to study the 
interaction effect of shared mental model levels, cockpit automation, and flight crew 
experience level on mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.  Two 
researcher-designed data collection instruments were used to determine the level of 
mental model sharedness and level of monitoring and backup behaviors among the 
participating cockpit flight crews.  The SMEs viewed the recorded ITO maneuvers and 
judged the levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors of the cockpit 
flight crews.  The cockpit operational relevance of flight crew pairings and the 
counterbalancing ITO maneuver Latin Square observation design mitigated internal and 
external threats to the study.  The following chapter describes the results of the study’s 






ANALYSIS OF DATA  
The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of the ITO maneuver shared 
mental model among Coast Guard aircraft cockpit flight crews, ITO type (coupled or 
manual), and cockpit flight crew total flight time on mutual performance monitoring and 
backup behaviors.  The researcher designed the Shared Mental Model Instrument and the 
Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument for specific data collection efforts.  Each MH-
65 pilot participating in the study completed the Shared Mental Model Instrument, and 
the data on the instrument helped determine the level of mental model sharedness 
between the cockpit flight crew regarding critical tasks associated with the coupled and 
manual ITO.  By calculating the Shared Mental Model Instruments completed by pilots in 
each cockpit flight crew, the researcher created a shared mental model score.  The 
researcher later compared the shared mental model score with mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors performed by each cockpit flight crew during the ITOs.  
The researcher also used the Shared Mental Model Instrument to capture descriptive 
statistics of each cockpit flight crew (designation/qualification, total pilot flight time).  
The purpose of the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument was to determine the level of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors occurring between each cockpit 
flight crew during the coupled and manual ITOs and to create a coupled and manual ITO 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior score for each cockpit flight crew.  
The Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments were completed by CRM SMEs observing 
the recording of each cockpit flight crew’s ITO maneuvers and determined observed 




crews.  The chapter presents the data analysis results for each of the six research 
objectives of the study.   
Demographics 
 The demographics of the study participants were collected on the Shared Mental 
Model Instrument.  Pilots self-reported designation/qualification and their total flight 
time.  After completing the data collection preparation steps as described in the previous 
chapter, the researcher compiled the Shared Mental Model Instrument to produce a 
designation/qualification pairing descriptive statistic for each cockpit flight crew.  Pilot 
total flight time on the Shared Mental Model Instrument was used for determining 
cockpit flight crew total flight time.  
Research Objective One (RO1) 
 The purpose of RO1 was to show descriptive statistics of the sample population 
according to pilot designation/qualification (instructor pilot, aircraft commander, first 
pilot, copilot) and cockpit total flight time experience.  All MH-65 pilot designations 
were represented in the population convenience sample (N = 30) of the cockpit flight 
crews.  Each cockpit flight crew contained at least one pilot with either an instructor pilot 
or aircraft commander.  Of the 30 cockpit flight crews, instructor pilots were part of 60% 
(n = 18) of the cockpit flight crews, and aircraft commanders were part of the remaining 
40% (n = 12).  The cockpit flight crew pairing in the sample population represented all 
normal designation pairings and experience levels normally found in Coast Guard 
cockpits.  Table 8 shows the study’s cockpit flight crews ranked by paired designation 




training, aviation experience, maturity, aviation decision making, Coast Guard 
operational experience, and multipiloted aircraft CRM experience.   
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics of Cockpit Flight Crews 
 
Cockpit Flight Crew by Paired Designation/Qualification       
 
Pilot 1 Pilot 2 N 
instructor pilot  instructor pilot 2 
instructor pilot  aircraft commander 8 
instructor pilot  first pilot 4 
instructor pilot  copilot 4 
aircraft commander  aircraft commander 8 
aircraft commander   first pilot 3 
aircraft commander  copilot 1 
Total Cockpit Flight Crews  30 
 
Of the 30 cockpit flight crews participating in the study, only five paired 
designation/qualification contained copilots.  The remaining 25 paired 
designation/qualification cockpit flight crews comprised of instructor pilots, aircraft 
commanders, or first pilots, thus representing higher levels of aircraft and Coast Guard 
operational experience and pilot in command competencies.  Ten cockpit flight crews 
contained similar pilot designations, e.g. instructor pilot and instructor pilot, aircraft 




cockpit flight crew designation/qualification setting in which both pilots held similar 
designation, qualification, and pilot in command abilities.  In a multipiloted Coast Guard 
cockpit, the pilot functioning as the pilot in command normally provides leadership in the 
cockpit environment and is responsible for a safe execution of the flight.  During the 
coupled and manual ITO maneuvers in the MH-65 OFT with cockpits containing similar 
pilot designation/qualifications, the pilot flying the aircraft assumed the role of pilot in 
command.      
To gauge the overall experience and maturity level of the participating cockpit 
flight crews, the study combined the total flight hours of each cockpit flight crew (two 
pilots) to create a cockpit flight crew total flight time variable.  Individual total flight time 
of each pilot was self-reported on the Shared Mental Model Instrument and combined 
with the other cockpit flight crewmember to establish a cockpit flight crew total flight 
time.  Table 9 shows the minimum, maximum, mean, and SD for cockpit flight crew total 
flight time.    
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics of Cockpit Flight Crew Total Flight Time 
 
Variable  N  Min  Max  Mean  SD 
      
 
Cockpit Flight Crew  30  2005  9100  4652  1827 
Total Flight Time 
 
 
One of the four instructor pilot / copilot cockpit flight crew designation pairings had a 
minimum flight crew total flight time of 2005 with the instructor pilot having 1600 total 




having the maximum combined total flight hours of 9100 was a paired designation of 
aircraft commander and aircraft commander.  The combined cockpit flight crew total 
time mean of 4652 showed normal levels of combined flight time experience for Coast 
Guard multipiloted cockpits.   
Since the focus of the study was the combined experience level of the cockpit 
flight crew on ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors, the individual 
total flight time self-reported on the Shared Mental Model Instruments was not used as a 
study variable.  However, the range of the individual total flight time of the pilot 
participants ranged from a copilot with 405 total flight hours to a 7500 flight hour aircraft 
commander.  Four of the five copilots had less than 1000 hours of total flight time, a 
normal amount of time for Coast Guard Air Station duty-standing pilots holding a copilot 
designation.     
Results 
Data for the following research objectives were collected on the study’s two 
researcher-designed data collection instruments.  Research objective 2 shows the data 
analysis of cockpit flight crews’ shared mental model scores.  Research objectives 3, 4, 5, 
and 6 show the relationships and interactions of the study’s three independent variables 
on observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.   
Research Objective Two (RO2) 
The purpose of RO2 was to show the level of mental model sharedness between 
each MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crew regarding the ITO maneuver.  A shared mental 
model was determined by each pilot of a cockpit flight crew scoring the relatedness of 




crew were aggregated to produce a shared mental model score.  A lower shared mental 
model score represented a higher level of shared mental model regarding seven critical 
team tasks.  Complete agreement between a cockpit flight crew regarding the relatedness 
of ITO maneuver critical team tasks would result in a score of zero (highest possible level 
of shared mental model) while complete disagreement of ITO maneuver critical team 
tasks would result in a score of 84 (lowest level possible level of shared mental model).  
The minimum shared mental model score of 14 was recorded for two cockpit flight crews 
with designation/qualification pairings of aircraft commander / first pilot and instructor 
pilot / copilot.  The highest aggregated shared mental model score of 51 occurred 
between an aircraft commander / first pilot.  Table 10 shows the minimum, maximum, 
mean and SD for cockpit flight crew shared mental model scores.  
Table 10 
Shared Mental Model Score 
 
 
Variable                        Min  Max  Mean  SD 
      
 
Score     14  51  23.43  7.74 
 
 
 No cockpit flight crew showed total agreement on the relatedness of the seven 
critical team tasks (zero shared mental model score), but all cockpit flight crews shared 
mental model scores that fell within the lower two-thirds of possible scores, indicating a 
general agreement by the cockpit flight crews on the levels of relatedness of the seven 
critical team tasks of the ITO maneuvers.  The cockpit flight crews shared mental model 




time indicating the existence of shared mental models at all levels of cockpit flight crew 
experience and maturity. 
Data Analysis of Cockpit Flight Crews Mutual Performance Monitoring and Backup 
Behaviors  
 Research objectives 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the relationships and interactions of the 
study’s independent variables on observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and 
backup behaviors by cockpit flight crews during the ITO maneuvers flown in the MH-65 
OFT.  After completing the data collection preparation steps as described in the previous 
chapter, the researcher compiled the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instruments to produce 
a coupled ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior score and manual 
ITO mutual performance monitoring for each cockpit flight crew.  The following data 
analysis shows the mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior scores by each 
research objective and independent variable.  An alpha of .05 was used for all statistical 
tests.  
Research Objective Three (RO3) 
The purpose of RO3 was to show the relationship between a cockpit flight crew 
ITO maneuver shared mental model score and observed levels of mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors during the ITO maneuvers.  Since the shared mental 
model score and ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior scores are 
quantitative in nature, the researcher used the Pearson’s r to assess the linear relationship 
between the shared mental model score independent variable and coupled and manual 
ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors dependent variables (Green & 




and coupled ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behavior score was not 
significant, r(28) = .26, p = .160.  The correlation between cockpit flight crew shared 
mental model and manual ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors 
was not significant, r(28) = .14, p = .463.  The results indicate that for the 30 cockpit 
flight crews, there is no relationship between levels of mental model sharedness and 
observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the ITO 
maneuvers.  Higher levels of mental model sharedness of the relatedness of ITO 
maneuver critical team tasks among cockpit flight crews may reflect in both higher levels 
and lower levels of coupled and manual ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors.      
Research Objective Four (RO4)  
The purpose of RO4 was to compare the type of instrument takeoff (coupled or 
manual) on observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in 
MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews.  The type of ITO serves as the repeated measures 
design of the study which enabled both pilots of the two-pilot cockpit flight crew to be 
measured in pilot flying and pilot monitoring roles during the coupled and manual ITOs.  
It was important to measure mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors for 
both the pilot flying and pilot monitoring during the ITO maneuver because in 
multipiloted cockpits, both pilots provide mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors to each other simultaneously despite which pilot is actual flying the aircraft.  A 
one sample t test was conducted to compare mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors between the coupled and manual ITOs.  According to Green & Salkind (2011), 




.05, the test was statistically significant, t(29) = 2.576, p < .015, M = 6.7, SD = 14.24, 
indicating that for the 30 cockpit flight crews, mutual performance monitoring and 
backup behaviors changed between coupled and manual ITOs.  Cockpit flight 
crewmembers show higher levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors when flying manual ITOs than coupled ITOs.  Though both types of ITOs are 
designed to establish an instrument climbout profile when transitioning to forward flight 
following overwater hover operations, cockpit flight crews showed higher levels of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors when the pilot manually flew the 
aircraft as opposed to using embedded aircraft systems through cockpit automation.  The 
cockpit flight crews monitored each other, but it is still unclear whether pilot monitoring 
of cockpit automation and pilot monitoring of the other pilot is similar.  The data analysis 
of RO4 shows that cockpit automation may have affected the level and quality of mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behaviors between cockpit flight crews.      
Research Objective Five (RO5) 
The purpose of RO5 was to show the relationship between cockpit flight crew 
total flight time and observed levels and mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors in MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews.  Using data collected from both the 
Shared Mental Model Instruments and the completed Monitoring/Backup Behavior 
Instruments, a Pearson’s r tested the linear relationship between the quantitative variables 
of cockpit flight crew total flight time and coupled and manual ITO mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behavior scores.  The statistical analysis for RO5 is similar to that 
found in RO3.  The correlation between cockpit flight crew total flight time and coupled 




p = .734, and the correlation between cockpit flight crew total flight time and manual ITO 
mutual performance monitoring/backup behaviors was not significant, r(28) = .005, p = 
.979.  The results indicate that for the 30 cockpit flight crews, there is no relationship 
between the higher levels cockpit flight total flight time and increased levels of mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the coupled and manual ITO 
maneuvers.  Higher cockpit flight crew total flight time did not increase or decrease 
observed levels of coupled and manual ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors.  Cockpit flight crew total flight time varied from 2005 to 9100 total flight 
hours, and the coupled and manual ITO mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors varied in both high and low time flight crews.  The results indicate that aviation 
experience and maturity level, measured in pilot flight time, is not an indicator of 
potential levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors. 
Research Objective Six (RO6) 
The purpose of RO6 was to show the combined interaction effect of the ITO 
maneuver shared mental model score, ITO type (coupled or manual), and flight crew total 
flight time on observed levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors in 
MH-65 aircraft cockpit flight crews.  Since cockpit flight crew shared mental models, 
cockpit automation, and the experience and maturity of the flight crew exist and are 
possibly interconnected in Coast Guard MH-65 multipiloted cockpits,  a repeated 
measures ANCOVA was used to determine the combined interaction effect of the study’s 
three independent variables:  1) ITO type (within-subjects nominal variable), 2) shared 
mental model (SMM) score (interval variable), and 3) flight crew total flight time 




and backup behaviors.  The repeated measures design allowed for multiple observations 
of the ITO type within-subject factor.  The between-subject independent variables were 
the shared mental model score and flight crew total flight time of the participating cockpit 
flight crews. Typically, in repeated measures analyses, the between-subject independent 
variables are categorical in nature and represent groupings.  Both between-subject 
independent variables in the study were interval and did not fit the traditional repeated 
measures model analyses.  Researchers argue that categorizing quantitative variables to 
conform to a particular statistical model or simplify collected data reduces the inherent 
variability of the measurements and can hide true variable relationships (Seaman & 
Allen, 2014; Taylor, 2011; B. Johnson, personal communication, October 21, 2014).  
Therefore, instead of categorizing the interval variables to conform to an ANOVA using 
repeated measures, both between-subject independent variables were measured as 
covariates to determine their combined interaction effect on the dependent variable of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.    
The statistical assumptions normally associated with ANCOVA, such as equal 
regression slopes and linear relationship between covariates and the dependent variable, 
were presumed outside the study’s considerations since the ANCOVA statistical 
methodology was primarily used to preserve the quantitative independent variables as 
collected (Taylor, 2011).  The researcher focused on the combined interaction effect and 
not the control of the study’s quantitative independent variables.  The assumption of 
sphericity was not required since the within-subject effect contained only two levels i.e. 
coupled and manual (Park, Cho, & Ki, 2009).  The researcher measured the strength of 




relationships were low and not statistically significant (p > .05).  However, the shared 
mental model score showed a stronger relationship than flight crew total flight time to the 
monitoring and backup behaviors.   
The repeated measures ANCOVA includes all main effects and interaction 
effects, and the results indicated no statistically significant interaction of the shared 
mental model score, cockpit total flight time, and within-subjects effects of ITO type,  
F (1, 26) = 1.199, p = .284. (see Tables 11 and Table 12).  The entire repeated measures 
ANCOVA SPSS output is included for clarification, but the research interest lay in the 
combined interaction effect of the study’s three independent variables of ITO type, 
shared mental model score, and cockpit total flight time found on Table 11.  The results 
indicate that interconnectedness and existence of cockpit flight crew shared mental 
models, cockpit automation, and the experience and maturity of the cockpit flight crew 
did not affect levels of coupled and manual ITO mutual performance monitoring and 






Analysis of Covariance Summary of Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
 
Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F p-value 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
















125.269 1 125.269 1.199 .284 .044 
Error 2717.297 26 104.511 
   
Total 3302.384   







Analysis of Covariance Summary of Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F p-value 
Partial Eta 
Squared 











69.650 1 69.650 .278 .603 .011 






.044 1 .044 .000 .990 <.001 
Error 6516.961 26 250.652 
   
Total 7864.99   







The purpose of the study was to examine the effect of the ITO maneuver shared 
mental model among Coast Guard aircraft cockpit flight crews, ITO type, and cockpit 
flight crew total flight time on ITO maneuver mutual performance monitoring and 
backup behaviors.  Cockpit flight crews flew ITOs in the MH-65 OFT as part of their 
Proficiency Simulator Course at ATC Mobile.  The ITOs were recorded, and later two 
CRM SMEs viewed them to judge the levels of ITO maneuver mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors between the two-pilot flight crew.  The results showed 
no statistically significant main effects or interaction effects of shared mental model 
score, ITO type, or cockpit flight time.  However, the data indicated that cockpit 
automation, or the lack thereof, influenced cockpit flight crews’ levels of mutual 









The following chapter is a summary of the study’s findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations.  The researcher discusses conclusions and appropriate 
recommendations based on the data analysis findings while considering the study’s 
limitations.  The researcher makes recommendations for future research regarding the 
role of shared mental models and cockpit automation on mutual performance monitoring 
and backup behaviors in aircraft cockpits.    
Summary of the Study 
Aircraft cockpit flight crews use CRM to increase flight safety by strengthening 
teamwork performance (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009).  Researchers (Flin et al., 2008; 
O’Conner & O’Dea, 2007; U.S. Coast Guard, 2009b; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) 
suggest that CRM in multipiloted cockpits reduces human error, thereby increasing flight 
safety.  Others (Cook et al., 2004; Dekker, 2002, 2003, 2006; Reason, 2008) argue that 
flight safety in mutipiloted cockpits increases not by reducing human error but by 
improving teamwork performance and introducing human elements of resiliency, 
flexibility, and adaptability into the inherently unsafe sociotechnical aviation system.  
Resiliency, flexibility, and adaptability among cockpit flight crews represent crew 
coordination and team processes and are based on the presence of cockpit flight crew 
shared mental models (Grote et al., 2010; Krieger, 2005; Sperling & Pritchett, 2011).  
Shared mental models provide the underpinning for mutual performance monitoring and 
backup behavior decisions among flight crewmembers (Salas, Rosen et al., 2006; Wilson 




The study’s literature review shows recent Coast Guard aviation mishaps and the 
subsequent responses by the Coast Guard for reducing accidents by changing CRM 
training for cockpit flight crews.  However, the Coast Guard’s approach to reducing 
accidents is based on, and promotes, a cause-and-effect linear sequencing view of human 
error in the cockpit.  The cause-and-effect linear sequencing view of human error in the 
cockpit fails to recognize the complexity of interrelated sociotechnical systems and the 
role humans play in those systems.   
The training of CRM for cockpit flight crews began in the 1970s and continues 
today in both commercial and military aviation.  Coast Guard CRM training for cockpit 
flight crews began in the early 1990s and continues today, focusing on both cognitive 
skills (e.g. decision making and situational awareness) and teamwork social skills (e.g. 
communication and assertiveness).  However, research shows that teamwork processes 
for improving cockpit flight crew coordination rely on a shared cognition represented in 
shared mental models.  Marks et al. (2000), Mathieu et al. (2005), and Mathieu et al. 
(2000) show shared mental models producing effective mutual performance monitoring 
and backup behaviors between the cockpit flight crewmembers.   
To examine the effect of shared mental models on cockpit flight crew 
coordination, thirty MH-65 cockpit flight crews were evaluated on mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors while flying critical night overwater ITOs in the MH-
65 Operational Flight Trainer located at ATC Mobile.  The researcher examined the 
relationships and interaction effects of cockpit flight crew shared mental model, cockpit 




levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the coupled and 
manual ITOs. 
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The following findings and conclusions are from the data collected and 
subsequent statistical analysis and based on a study’s research objectives.  Each research 
objective indicates a specific finding followed by a specific conclusion derived from the 
finding.  A recommendation follows each study finding and conclusion. 
Coast Guard Aircraft Cockpit Flight Crews Shared Mental Models   
Shared mental models are knowledge structures among team members describing 
the level of similarity, convergence, agreement, consensus, commonality, compatibility, 
and consistency of those knowledge structures (Mohammed et al., 2010).  In highly 
dynamic environments of Coast Guard multipiloted cockpits during critical night 
overwater maneuvers, the shared agreement and consensus of crew mental models were 
task specific to coupled and manual ITO critical tasks for completing the ITO maneuver.   
Finding.  Shared mental models exist between Coast Guard MH-65 cockpit flight 
crews on critical team tasks associated with critical night overwater ITOs.  The cockpit 
flight crew mental model is scoreable representing levels of sharedness regarding the 
critical team tasks of coupled and manual ITOs.  Each MH-65 cockpit flight crew had a 
shared mental model score level indicating a general agreement by the cockpit flight 
crews on the levels of relatedness of the seven critical team tasks of the ITO maneuvers.  
The cockpit flight crews shared mental model scores were seen in both high and low 




Conclusion.  Shared mental models exist in Coast Guard cockpits and that the 
level of mental model sharedness between cockpit flight crews is associated with specific 
cockpit tasks.  Consistent with the findings of Marks et al. (2000), Mathieu et al. (2005), 
and Mathieu et al. (2000), cockpit flight crew mental model sharedness is a quantifiable 
score that can be determined by surveying cockpit flight crews on the specific cockpit 
flight crew tasks.  A shared mental model among cockpit flight crews is necessary to 
perform successfully critical low overwater coupled and manual ITO maneuvers in the 
night environment.  Standardized operating procedures and flight crew verbal 
communication, i.e. pilot briefing, establishes the cockpit flight crew shared mental 
model for the coupled and manual ITO maneuvers.   
Recommendation.  All critical flight maneuvers performed in the Coast Guard 
aircraft by cockpit flight crews, e.g. instrument takeoffs and approaches, visual takeoffs 
and landings, and nighttime low overwater operations, should have cockpit flight crew 
standardized operating procedures and preestablished verbal communication.  Coast 
Guard cockpit flight crews should be continuously assessed on the ability to perform the 
standardized critical flight maneuvers both as the pilot flying and as pilot monitoring.    
Coast Guard Aircraft Cockpit Flight Crew Shared Mental Models and Mutual 
Performance Monitoring and Backup Behaviors 
High-performing teams use shared mental models to anticipate the needs of other 
team members and provide timely, error-free exchange of information when necessary 
(Entin & Serfaty, 1999).  Cockpit flight crewmembers increase crew coordination and 
improve flight safety by monitoring each other and providing backup when required.  




performance monitoring and backup behaviors allow cockpit flight crewmembers to 
detect mistakes made by other crewmembers and serves as the final defense in cockpit 
human errors.   
Finding.  The study’s finding did not show statistical significance for the 
relationship between the higher levels of mental model sharedness and increased levels of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the ITO maneuvers.  The 
finding indicates cockpit shared mental models can be associated with both high and low 
levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.  More specifically, 
higher levels of mental model sharedness in the cockpit do not necessarily translate into 
increased levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.  
Conclusion.  Coast Guard cockpit flight crewmembers act and create appropriate 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors to improve crew coordination, 
thus producing safer cockpit flight crews regardless of levels of mental model sharedness.  
Though the purpose of the study was to determine the role of cockpit shared mental 
models in the team coordination skills of mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors, the study shows that monitoring and backing up behaviors occur among Coast 
Guard cockpit flight crewmembers with both low and high levels of mental model 
sharedness.        
Cockpit human error is inevitable in the complex sociotechnical aviation system 
which is inherently unsafe, and Coast Guard cockpit flight crews create flight safety by 
monitoring and backup behaviors despite shared mental model agreement levels.  The 
key point here is that flight safety is not improved in Coast Guard multipiloted cockpits 




created when flight crews adapt, through human resiliency and flexibility, and determine 
proper monitoring and backup responses for a given situation.  Furthermore, Coast Guard 
cockpit flight crews create flight safety by adapting and responding to changing situations 
in highly complex and hazardous flight environments with appropriate mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behaviors.  Given the results of this study, it is 
unclear whether shared mental models positively influence or mediate mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behaviors when cockpit flight crews create flight 
safety.  
Recommendation.  Coast Guard aviation leadership should accept that aircraft 
accidents will continue to occur because of the inevitability of human error in the 
complex sociotechnical aviation system.  Because of the inevitability of human error in 
Coast Guard cockpits, flight crews need to recognize they are responsible for creating 
safety in the cockpit through effective team coordination CRM skills of mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behaviors.  Based on the findings of this research 
and related literature, this author recommends a stronger linkage between backup 
behaviors and mutual performance monitoring in CRM training for Coast Guard cockpit 
flight crews.  Agreeing with Sumwalt et al. (2003), the researcher also recommends pilot 
monitoring skills as the next focus for cockpit flight crew CRM training.  The training 
could be associated with flight discipline (i.e. defined crew duties, checklist use, 
standardized cockpit communication) providing further illumination of cockpit flight 
crew performances possibly related to mutual performance monitoring and backup 





Cockpit Automation and Cockpit Flight Crew Mutual Performance Monitoring and 
Backup Behaviors 
Cockpit automation can lead to poor human-monitoring performance (Casner & 
Schooler, 2014; Comstock & Arnegard, 1992; Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Dismukes & 
Berman, 2010).  Pilot monitoring behaviors involve scanning and processing of both 
aircraft automated systems and the actions of the other pilot to determine the allocation of 
attention resources to areas of need (Potter et al., 2014).  However, the management of 
cockpit automation by cockpit flight crews can be distracting to the point that they fail to 
monitor each other adequately at a time it’s needed the most (Langewiesche, 2014).   
Finding.  Flight crews exhibited more backup and monitoring behaviors when 
performing manual ITOs than when performing coupled ITOs.  Specifically, pilots 
increase monitoring/backup behaviors with lower levels of cockpit automation.   
Conclusion.  Cockpit automation affects the nature and level of mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behaviors occurring between cockpit flight 
crewmembers during the ITO maneuvers.  Higher levels of cockpit automation leads to 
lower levels of mutual monitoring performance between cockpit flight crews.  The 
researcher concludes that highly reliable cockpit automated systems lead to lower 
monitoring performance because of the perceived lower probability of error of the 
aircraft’s automated system.  Agreeing with Hamilton (2010), the researcher concludes 
that as cockpit automation levels increase, the cockpit flight crew workload increases 
attempting to understand, monitor, and control the automation.  If cockpit automation 
fails, the cockpit workload further increases as pilots attempt to understand the failure 




 The U.S. Coast Guard (2013) automation pyramid conceptual framework 
regarding the flight discipline of cockpit automation shows decreasing levels of workload 
and increasing levels of situational awareness with higher levels of cockpit automation 
(see Figure 7).  The automation pyramid indicates that cockpit automation reduces 
cockpit workload and shows lower pilot monitoring requirements of cockpit automation 
and the other pilot.  The Coast Guard’s automation pyramid also indicates that the 
situational awareness of cockpit flight crews increases with higher levels of cockpit 
automation.   
 
Figure 7. Coast Guard’s Automation Pyramid depicting the relationship between 
situation awareness (SA) cockpit workload with different levels of cockpit automation.  
Adapted from “U.S. Coast Guard Air Operations Manual, COMDTINST 3710.1G.” 
Washington, DC:  Author. p. 4-5.  Copyright 2013 by the U.S. Coast Guard.  Adapted 
with permission. 
 
According to Endsley (2010), the benefits of cockpit automation occur when the 




automation misaligns with the flight crew’s plan, the flight crew becomes “outside-of-the 
loop” of the automation, in turn reducing the flight crew’s situational awareness.  The 
researcher agrees with the situational awareness impacts to cockpit flight crews caused by 
cockpit automation that Endsley sets forth. 
Recommendation.  Coast Guard cockpit flight crews need a better understanding 
of the relationship between cockpit automation and pilot workload and the potential 
impacts of cockpit automation to mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors 
in the cockpit.  Coast Guard policy on the use of cockpit automation should properly 
reflect increases of cockpit flight crew workload and monitoring behavior requirements 
with higher cockpit automation levels.  Coast Guard pilots need to understand that 
cockpit automation requires the same and possibly increased levels of monitoring and 
backup behaviors compared to the automated system.  Coast Guard CRM training should 
address the requirement for increased levels of crew coordination, specifically increasing 
levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors between the cockpit 
flight crew 
flight crew when using cockpit automation.  Agreeing with Tesmer (2010), the researcher 
recommends that cockpit flight crews be taught to treat cockpit automation as the 
“dumbest crewmember of the flight crew” since the automation is unable to establish the 
true nature of the cockpit flight crew intent when utilized (p. 293).   
Aviation Experience on Cockpit Flight Crew Mutual Performance Monitoring and 
Backup Behaviors 
 Team members with more experience working together request and accept more 




familiarity (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2009).  In multipiloted cockpits, the type and level of 
interaction and communication between the pilots is based on experience and maturity 
level of each pilot (Prince et al., 2010).   
Finding.  This study’s did not show statistical significance for the relationship 
between the higher levels cockpit flight crew total flight time and increased levels of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors during the ITO maneuvers.  The 
finding indicates aviation experience, expressed through pilot total flight time, is 
associated with both high and low levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors.  In other words, higher total flight time does not necessarily translate into 
increased levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.   
Conclusion.  Pilots with low aviation experience may perform monitoring and 
backup behaviors as well as highly experienced pilots, and experienced pilots do not 
necessarily perform higher levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors.  Coast Guard cockpit flight crews of all aviation experience levels can exhibit 
appropriate levels of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors, implying 
that the team coordination CRM skills can be learned early in one’s aviation career.  
Agreeing with Tullo (2010), the researcher concludes that mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors need to be trained, practiced, and evaluated.      
 Recommendation.  Behaviors are learned through observing and modeling of 
behaviors in others (Ormrod, 1995).  The best way to teach mutual performance 
monitoring and backup behaviors is for an instructor pilot to model the appropriate 




performance monitoring and backup behaviors for Coast Guard cockpit flight crews, and 
that modeling must occur in the aircraft or OFT to be effective.       
Shared Mental Model, Cockpit Automation, and Aviation Experience on Cockpit Crew 
Mutual Performance Monitoring and Backup Behaviors 
Workload in the modern aircraft cockpits is divided into two groups:  workload 
demands from within the cockpit and workload demands from outside the cockpit 
(Hamilton, 2010).  In addition to normal aircraft flight cockpit workload demands, pilots 
must communicate, monitor, and back up the other pilot in multipiloted aircraft cockpits.   
Finding.  This study demonstrates no combined interaction effects between a 
cockpit flight crew shared mental model, cockpit automation, and pilot flight time on 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.   
Conclusion.  The interactions of shared mental models and aviation experience of 
cockpit flight crews, combined with cockpit automation tasks, have a minimal effect on 
each other.    
Limitations of the Study 
 According to Sprinthall (2012), statistical research is empirical, inductive, and 
interpretable.  The ability to infer from the study’s findings may be diminished by four 
study limitations.  The first limitation to the study is the sample population and size.  The 
population of the study is the 430 Coast Guard pilots who fly the MH-65 aircraft.  These 
pilots are located at Coast Guard units throughout the United States.  Short of having all 
430 pilots participate in the study, a random sample of study participants from the 
population would have provided the strongest ability for statistical inference.  The 




Proficiency Simulator Course to reduce time and study costs.  The Proficiency Simulator 
Course also allowed the use of the MH-65 Operational Flight Trainer located at ATC 
Mobile for data collection purposes.  The convenience sample introduced a sample error 
to the study.  Creating an abstract population for inferences purposes from a 
nonprobability sample ultimately reduced the sampling statistical power.  Data collection 
from the 30 cockpit flight crews participating in the study represents 7% of the MH-65 
pilot population.  The 7% of the MH-65 pilot population fell short of the sample size 
needed to ensure an acceptable confidence level and corresponding margin of error.  
Therefore, the study findings may not reflect the shared mental models and monitoring 
and backup behaviors of the entire MH-65 pilot population.     
 The second limitation is the study’s data collection instruments.  The researcher-
designed data collection instruments were designed to explore the study’s six research 
objectives.  The objective of the Shared Mental Model Instrument was determining the 
level of mental model sharedness between the MH-65 cockpit flight crewmembers about 
the seven ITO maneuver critical team tasks and producing a shared mental model score 
for each cockpit flight crew.  Similar to methods found in Marks et al. (2002), Mathieu et 
al. (2005) and Mathieu et al. (2000), the data collection instrument listed critical team 
tasks for both cockpit flight crewmembers.  The cockpit flight crews were asked to make 
judgments about the relatedness of the critical team tasks using a 5-point scale to 
determine the mental model sharedness between the cockpit flight crewmembers.  The 
researcher calculated a shared mental model score by aggregating the combined related 
values of the Shared Mental Model Instrument of each cockpit flight crew.  Conversely, 




gunship flight crew by feeding critical team task values into Pathfinder computer 
program and producing a similarity index.  Mathieu et al.’s (2005) shared mental model 
score was calculated using UCINET network analysis program thereby producing a 
centrality index.  The centrality index identified “network relationships underlying 
mental models in a fashion similar to…Pathfinder solutions” (Mathieu et al., 2005, p. 43).  
Marks et al. (2002) and Mathieu et al. (2005) used the computing power of Pathfinder’s 
knowledge structure assessment and UCINET’s social network analysis for mathematical 
shared mental model measurements.  A limitation to this study is the shared mental 
model measurement methodology of manually calculating the shared mental model score 
(index) instead of using the analytic capabilities of computer software.   
 The two CRM SMEs observed the recorded coupled and manual ITOs and used 
the researcher-designed Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument to record levels of 
mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors among cockpit flight crews.  The 
instrument did not function as originally designed because many of the monitoring and 
backup behavior markers statements were written based on possible mistakes and 
procedural errors by the pilot flying and pilot monitoring.  When mistakes and procedural 
errors did not occur, the monitoring and backup behavior marker was unobservable.  This 
discrepancy became apparent to the researcher following university and Coast Guard IRB 
approval and during cockpit flight crew data collection.  Even though additional training 
was held for the two CRM SMEs to mitigate the instrument discrepancy, a low Pearson’s 
r interrater reliability score between the two CRM SMEs for coupled and manual scores 
possibly occurred as a result of the Monitoring/Backup Behavior Instrument mutual 




 A third limitation is the statistical analysis of the data.  The statistical analysis of 
the three independent variables and one dependent variable was based on the desired 
outcome of each research objective.  Since the research objectives and data collection 
design drove the statistical tests, the between-subject quantitative variables were left 
intact and analyzed with a repeated measures ANCOVA.  The researcher agrees that 
disregarding normal ANCOVA statistical assumptions to preserve the quantitative 
independent variables reduced the study’s statistical validity but found disregarding 
statistical assumptions necessary when using the repeated measures design.  Therefore, 
the shared mental model score and cockpit total flight time were treated as independent 
interval variables and not true study covariates.   
 The researcher's place of employment for the study’s setting was the fourth 
limitation and may have influenced the study’s results.  While all cockpit flight crews 
asked to participate did so, the environment of the Coast Guard Aviation Training Center 
and the importance of the pilots’ annual Proficiency Simulator Course may have swayed 
their decision to participate.  The esprit de corps of the aviation profession and team 
nature of the pilot community may have duly impelled individual Coast Guard pilots to 
participate.  Though audio and video recordings of the Proficiency Simulator Course 
instructional events are standard protocol, the recordings may have altered the interaction 
of cockpit flight crew and the level monitoring and backup behaviors displayed by the 
pilots.  Pilots may have altered their normal verbal interaction and communication to 






Recommendations for Further Research 
 While the results of the study provide insight into the influence of shared mental 
models and cockpit automation on cockpit flight crew monitoring and backup behaviors, 
the potential for further research exists.  Based on the study’s findings, the following are 
recommendations for future research: 
1. While early attempts of CRM training focused on increasing assertiveness of 
copilots and reducing dictatorial personalities of pilots in command, today’s 
cockpits are highly automated, and flight crews are normally taught during initial 
stages of training to work as a team.  Flight disciplines such as standard operating 
procedures for cockpit flight crews, defined crew duties, and the use of cockpit 
checklist are embedded in today’s cockpit team processes.  However, research is 
necessary to clarify the role of shared mental models in team coordination CRM 
skills of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors and their tie to 
aviation flight discipline practices.    
2. The critical CRM skills found in Orlady and Foushee (1987), Helmreich and 
Foushee (1993), and Prince and Salas (1993) may still be applicable today, but 
research is necessary to show how to translate those critical CRM skills identified 
20 years ago into creating flight safety in today’s highly automated cockpits.   
3. Aviation CRM training rooted in human error elimination promotes only the 
cause and effect solution and is normally a result of post-accident aviation 
investigations fraught with hindsight bias and a cause-consequence human error 




complex systems, further research is necessary to understand humans’ 
contribution to flight safety.    
4. The safety data collection program Line Operations Safety Audit is an aviation 
industry attempt to identify successful CRM skills displayed by cockpit flight 
crews in the actual operational environment.  A Line Operations Safety Audit 
evaluates cockpit flight crew performance in normal day-to-day operations 
identifying sociotechnical aviation system issues related to safety (Tesmer, 2010).   
A Continental Airlines Line Operations Safety Audit showed that cockpit flight 
crews with good CRM behaviors performed better in the complex sociotechnical 
aviation system than those with poor CRM behaviors (Tesmer, 2010).  Human 
contribution to flight safety should be further explored through a similar-type 
analysis.  The analysis would further illuminate successful CRM mutual 
performance monitoring and backup behaviors of frontline pilot professionals 
operating in the complex sociotechnical aviation system. 
5. Other U.S. military services should replicate the current study in other aircraft 
types using full-mission OFTs.  Since all military services of the United States use 
state-of-the-art full-mission OFTs for all initial and recurrent pilot training, the 
opportunity for replicating team coordination CRM skills research using full-
mission OFTs is abundant.   
Conclusion 
 Aviation CRM is now the most widely used strategy for team coordination 
training for cockpit flight crews, and it is utilized in the Coast Guard to improve each 




relationships and interaction of the ITO maneuver shared mental model, type of ITO, and 
cockpit flight crew total flight time on mutual performance monitoring and backup 
behaviors.  Sumwalt et al. (2003) argue that monitoring and backup skills are the next 
focus of CRM training.  The goal of the research is to help Coast Guard aviation 
leadership find ways to improve flight safety in the Coast Guard cockpits.  Because Coast 
Guard flight crews must continuously operate in a sociotechnical aviation system that is 
complex, imperfect, ambiguous, and often contradicting, monitoring and backup skills 
must be the next focus of CRM training for Coast Guard flight crews.    
 For Coast Guard flight crews to operate effectively in extreme and hazardous 
environments such as night overwater ITO maneuvers, crews require high levels of 
coordination.  However, instances of failing to monitor and backup are occurring in Coast 
Guard aircraft accidents.  Just telling cockpit flight crews to monitor and backup more is 
not enough.  A better understanding of the role of shared mental models in flight crew 
team coordination CRM skills of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors 
is necessary.  Coast Guard flight crews must take advantage of the multipiloted human 
redundancy of mutual performance monitoring and backup behaviors.   
 A success example of cockpit crew flight discipline, shared mental model, pilot 
monitoring and backup behaviors, and ultimate cockpit team effectiveness is US Airways 
Flight #1549 emergency water landing in the frigid waters of the Hudson River on 
January 15, 2009 (Fraher, 2011).  Following a bird strike and total failure of both 
engines, Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger and First Officer Jeffrey Skiles safely 
glided the damaged commercial aircraft to an emergency water landing, saving all 150 




regarding the US Air #1549 emergency water landing, Captain Sullenberger stressed the 
importance of CRM crew coordination monitoring and backup behaviors by saying, "I 
think it is that paying attention matters. That having awareness constantly matters. 
Continuing to build that mental model to build a team matters" (Langewiesche, 2009, p. 
23).  When high-risk situations happen to Coast Guard flight crews operating in the 
complex sociotechnical aviation system, Coast Guard cockpit flight crews need to be 
ready to react with high levels of crew coordination, similar to Captain Sullenberger and 
his crew, and create flight safety with shared mental models and critical monitoring and 
backup skills.  Creating flight safety with monitoring and backup behaviors is the CRM 
human capital performance outcome that can save the lives of the brave flight crews 






FLIGHT MISHAP CLASS COST BREAKDOWN 
FISCAL YEAR 2010 and Beyond  
Class A $2,000,000 or greater or death 
Class B $500,000 to $1,999,999 or serious injury 
Class C $50,000 to $499,999 or minor injury 
Class D Less than $49,999 
Class E Engine damage only, regardless of cost 
FISCAL YEAR 2002 to 2009 
Class A $1,000,000 or greater or death 
Class B $200,000 to $999,999 or serious injury 
Class C $20,000 to $199,999 or minor injury 
Class D Less than $20,000 
Class E Engine damage only, regardless of cost 
FISCAL YEAR 1989 to 2001 
Class A $1,000,000 or greater or death 
Class B $200,000 to $999,999 or serious injury 
Class C $10,000 to $199,999 or minor injury 
Class D Less than $10,000 
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MONITORING/BACKUP BEHAVIOR INSTRUMENT 
 
Mutual Performance Monitoring Behaviors 
 
1. The cockpit flight crew observed the behaviors and actions of each other. 
 
 (1) Not at all  (2)   (3)    (4)   (5) To a very great extent 
 
2. The cockpit flight crew recognized aircraft flight control mistakes made by the PAC. 
 
 (1) Not at all  (2)   (3)    (4)   (5) To a very great extent 
 
3. The cockpit flight crew recognized safety pilot/mutual performance monitoring mistakes 
made by the SP.   
 
 (1) Not at all  (2)   (3)    (4)   (5) To a very great extent 
 
4. The SP identified lapses in PAC ITO procedural steps.    
 
 (1) Not at all  (2)   (3)    (4)   (5) To a very great extent 
 
5. The PAC identified lapses in SP ITO procedural steps.  
 
 (1) Not at all  (2)   (3)    (4)   (5) To a very great extent 
 
Backup Behaviors  
 
6. The SP corrected PAC errors when necessary or when asked to do so 
 
 (1) Not at all  (2)   (3)    (4)   (5) To a very great extent 
 
7. The PAC corrected SP errors when necessary or when asked to do so.  
 
 (1) Not at all  (2)   (3)    (4)   (5) To a very great extent 
 
8. The SP completed ITO procedural tasks when the PAC failed to do so. 
 
 (1) Not at all  (2)   (3)    (4)   (5) To a very great extent 
 
9. The PAC completed ITO procedural tasks when the SP failed to do so.  
 
 (1) Not at all  (2)   (3)    (4)   (5) To a very great extent 
 
10. The cockpit crew recognized when the ITO was performed exceptionally well.  
 





APPENDIX E  
FOUR ITO MANEUVER LATIN SQUARE DESIGN 
Design 1 
Left Seat Pilot Right Seat Pilot 
Coupled ITO Safety Pilot 
Safety Pilot Manual ITO 
Manual ITO Safety Pilot 
Safety Pilot Coupled ITO 
Design 2 
Left Seat Pilot Right Seat Pilot 
Safety Pilot Manual ITO 
Manual ITO Safety Pilot 
Safety Pilot Coupled ITO 
Coupled ITO Safety Pilot 
Design 3 
Left Seat Pilot Right Seat Pilot 
Manual ITO Safety Pilot 
Safety Pilot Coupled ITO 
Coupled ITO Safety Pilot 
Safety Pilot Manual ITO 
Design 4 
Left Seat Pilot Right Seat Pilot 
Safety Pilot Coupled ITO 
Coupled ITO  Safety Pilot 
Safety Pilot Manual ITO 
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